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MISSOURI PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW REVISITED: A LOOK AT
MISSOURI STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW BEFORE AND
AFTER THE TORT REFORM ACT
Dennis J. Dobbels*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Supreme Court in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufactur-
ing Company' adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
(1965) version of strict products liability for products unreasonably dangerous
as manufactured. In Blevins v. Cushman Motors,2 the court extended the the-
ory to permit recovery for injuries caused by a product unreasonably danger-
ous as designed.' Almost ten years later in Nesselrode v. Executive Beech-
craft, Inc.," the court recognized an action for failure to warn based on the
theory of strict products liability. The court adopted strict products liability:
to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers [and sellers] that put such products on the market
* Associate at Polsinelli, White, Vardeman & Shalton, P.C., Kansas City, Mis-
souri. B.A. 1979, Yale University; J.D. 1982 University of California, Hastings College
of Law.
1. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
2. 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
3. The court stated that "there is no rational distinction between design and
manufacture in this context, since a product may be equally defective and dangerous if
its design subjects protected persons to unreasonable risks as if its manufacture does
so." Id. at 607 (quoting Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 475, 467 P.2d
229, 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1970) (en bane)). Before Blevins, the court had
reviewed cases submitted on a strict products liability defective design theory, but had
not explicitly extended the theory to a defective design case. See, e.g., Lietz v. Snyder
Mfg. Co., 475 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1972). The courts of appeal also had recognized that
defective design cases were cognizable under the theory of strict products liability. See,
e.g., Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); see also
Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., Inc., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973) (construing Mis-
souri law).
4. 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). Before the Nesselrode decision, the
supreme court had approved a jury instruction based on strict products liability for
failure to warn. M.A.I. 25.05 (1981). Courts of appeal also had applied strict products
liability for failure to warn. E.g., Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404,
418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied sub nom., Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
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rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.0
Since the Keener decision, the Missouri Supreme Court has reviewed or
commented on this theory on only a few occasions. 6 These decisions have left
unanswered many questions on the scope and nature of strict products liabil-
ity. This legal uncertainty has created problems as to the affordability and
availability of products liability insurance. In an effort to eliminate the legal
uncertainty and to solve the perceived insurance crisis, the Missouri General
Assembly recently passed the Missouri Tort Reform Act (the "Act").7 In
some areas, the Act will have little or no impact on Missouri strict products
liability law in that it does not change the law. On other issues, it makes
changes which are unworkable or significantly modify existing strict products
liability law.
This Article will discuss the status of strict products liability law in Mis-
souri before passage of the Act.8 It will focus on the elements and standards of
a strict products liability action, on issues of causation and comparative fault,
on the issue of joint and several liability, and on questions regarding choice of
law and the statute of limitations. A better understanding of these issues and
of the Act's effect on existing law should lead to a more uniform application of
the strict products liability theory to future cases.
5. Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 606-07 (quoting Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969) (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963))).
6. See, e.g., Fahy v. Dresser Indust., Inc., 740 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc); Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Barnes
v. Tools & Mach. Builders, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Lippard v.
Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec.,
632 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602
(Mo. 1977) (en banc); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc); Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Giber-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974); Lietz v. Snyder, 475 S.W.2d 105
(Mo. 1972), Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970).
7. The Act states:
Section C. Because immediate action is necessary to restore the affordability
and availability of liability insurance this act is deemed necessary for the im-
mediate preservation of the public health, welfare, peace and safety, and is
hereby declared to be an emergency act within the meaning of the constitu-
tion, and this act shall be in full force and effect on July 1, 1987, or upon final
passage and approval, whichever later occurs.
H.B. No. 700, 84th General Assembly, First Regular Session (April 1987) (hereinafter
"H.B. 700") (section C was subsequently dropped).
8. The Act only applies to actions accruing after July 1, 1987. Section C, H.B.
700. Accordingly, courts will continue to apply existing strict products liability law to
cases accruing before July 1. In addition, the courts will continue to apply existing law
when interpreting the Act.
[Vol. 53
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/2
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
II. NATURE OF A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE
The Missouri Supreme Court recently discussed the nature of strict prod-
ucts liability in Missouri in Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.9 The
court stated that "the focal point of the litigation process is the condition or
character of the product and not the character of the defendant's con-
duct-thereby excising the concept of reasonable care, the limits test of liabil-
ity in negligence law, from Missouri's rule of strict tort liability." 10 At the
same time, the Nesselrode court stressed that "the manufacturer is not an
insurer for all injuries caused by his product." 1  These statements had been
made in earlier Missouri decisions,12 but the Nesselrode court set out the deci-
sional framework from which lower courts and litigants should proceed in
resolving future strict products liability cases.
9. 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
10. Id. at 375. In Blevins, the court had noted the "important distinction" be-
tween negligence and strict liability focuses on foreseeability. In negligence, "the duty
owed is based on the foreseeable 'or reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a
likely result of acts or omissions.'" Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 607 (quoting Hull v. Gil-
lioz, 344 Mo. 1227, -, 130 S.W.2d 623, 628 (1939)). Strict liability in tort, the
Blevins court explained, is based in part "on the foreseeability or 'reasonably antici-
pated' use of the product. . . ." Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 607 (citing Keener v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Mo. 1969)). Nesselrode highlights another as-
pect of the inquiry, the condition or character of the product.
11. Id. (quoting Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 37 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366-67, (1965)). One commentator questions
whether "the means sanctioned for determining whether a defect exists and for impos-
ing liability after a defect has been found" has blurred the distinction between strict
products liability and "absolute liability." Comment, Strict Products Liability: Mis-
souri Moves Toward Absolute Liability, 55 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 434, 435 (1987) (herein-
after Absolute Liability). He worries that Missouri courts' reliance upon "loss spread-
ing" as the rationale for strict products liability has caused them to approach "absolute
liability" in products liability cases. Id. passim. While this concern may be justified, it
fails to account for the common law development of safeguards to avoid imposition of
absolute liability. This Article discusses the common law and statutory development of
Missouri strict products liability law. It will comment on or suggest changes in the
evolution of Missouri strict products liability law to ensure that absolute liability is not
imposed on product manufacturers and sellers.
12. For example, courts had stated that strict products liability eliminates proof
of a violation of the standards of reasonable care. Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551
S.W.2d 602, 607 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683,
688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). Conversely, courts had emphasized that "[s]trict liability
does not equate with absolute liability," Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 637
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975), and that "[a] manufacturer is not an insurer nor must he create
a product which is accident proof," Brawner v. Liberty Indus., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 376,
377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see also Laney v. Coleman, Inc., 758 F.2d 1299, 1302 (8th
Cir. 1985) (construing Missouri law); Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d
911, 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). "The law merely imposes on [a] defendant the burden
of designing and constructing [a] reasonably safe [product]. . . ." Braun v. General
Motors Corp., 579 S.W.2d 766, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); see also Hurt v. General
Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir. 1977) (construing Missouri law).
19881
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A negligence action focuses on the reasonableness of the defendant's con-
duct. The parties litigate "the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in
designing and selling the article as he did."'1, "[T]he duty owed is based on
the foreseeable 'or reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result
of acts of omissions.' "1 4 A defendant's ability to know whether harm will re-
sult from use of its product is an essential element of a plaintiff's claim.
The primary inquiry in a strict products liability case is whether the prod-
uct creates an unreasonable risk of danger to the consumer or user when put
to a reasonably foreseeable use.15 Foreseeability of harm is not an element of
the claim. In a manufacturing defect case, if the product is not manufactured
according to design specifications and it, as manufactured, creates an "unrea-
sonable risk of danger" when put to a reasonably anticipated use, the defend-
ant would be liable for any damages caused by the manufacturing defect.
If the product which conforms to its intended design nonetheless creates
an "unreasonable risk of danger" which could have been remedied by an ade-
quate warning, but none was given, the defendant would be liable for any
damages caused by the failure to provide an adequate warning. If the product
conforming to its intended design creates an "unreasonable risk of danger"
that could not have been remedied by a warning, the defendant would be lia-
ble for any damages caused by a plaintiff's foreseeable use of such a "defec-
tive" product.15 A manufacturer is not liable for all injuries caused by use of a
13. Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 608 (quoting Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269
Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974) (en banc)).
14. Id. at 607. (quoting Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, -, 130 S.W.2d 623,
628 (1939) and citing Taylor v. Hitt, 342 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)).
15. Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 375. In Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d
8, 12 (Mo. 1974), the supreme court "extend[ed] any right flowing from the 'rule of
strict liability in tort' adopted in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company,
supra to include a bystander." The court reasoned that:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the con-
sumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably fore-
seeable. Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for
defects and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable
manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordina-
rily has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is in greater need of
protection from defective products which are dangerous, and if any distinction
should be made between bystanders and users, it should be made, contrary to
the position of defendants, to extend greater liability in favor of the
bystanders.
Id. at 10 (quoting Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84,
88, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1969)). The Act does not change the case law extending
liability to bystanders.
16. Courts and litigants often fail to recognize that a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff on the theory of strict products liability for design defect and failure to warn
are inconsistent. A product cannot be defectively designed if the jury finds the defend-
ant liable for failing to warn adequately. A case based upon liability of the manufac-
turer for failing to provide adequate warnings assumes that an adequate warning would
have prevented the accident by remedying the unreasonably dangerous condition of the
[Vol. 53
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product; it is liable only for injuries caused by the unreasonably dangerous
condition or character of the product when put to a reasonably foreseeable
use.
17
The Act should not change this decisional framework. The elements of a
strict products liability claim are essentially the same under the Act.'8 The
product. A defendant faced with a finding of liability both on a plaintiff's submission of
an instruction on design defect and an instruction based on failure to warn should
request clarification from the jury so that the issue will be preserved for appeal.
Douglass v. Safire, 712 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); see infra notes 112-19
and accompanying text.
17. In Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703
S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), the supreme court also held that the theory of
strict products liability, "as a matter of policy, [does not apply] where the only damage
is to the product sold," declining to follow the dicta in Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564
S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); see also Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.D.
Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (strict prod-
ucts liability not appropriate remedy for damage to product itself).
Where the loss sustained is economic only, strict products liability also does not
apply. Forrest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 904 (Higgins, J., dissenting); Clevenger & Wright Co.,
625 S.W.2d at 909 (strict liability in tort is not the appropriate remedy for these eco-
nomic and consequential damages). Remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial
Code apply. Id. But cf., Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 400 F.2d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir.
1974) (construing Missouri law) (loss of profits as a result of the tortious destruction of
the plaintiff's business was foreseeable and, thus, compensable).
The Act arguably eliminates these limitations. The Act defines the term "products
liability claim" as "a claim or portion of a claim in which the plaintiff seeks relief in
the form of damages on a theory that the defendant is strictly liable for such dam-
ages. . . ." Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.760 (Supp. 1987). It does not deny recovery where
damages sought are for damages to the product sold or for economic damages. In addi-
tion, because Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.765 (Supp. 1987) allows the jury to reduce recov-
ery for "failure to mitigate damages," a defense to recovery under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (hereinafter "U.C.C."), a court would have some basis for concluding
that the legislature intended to extend strict products liability to cases involving dam-
age to the product and to cases seeking economic damages caused as a result of the
defective unreasonably dangerous condition of the product.
The better interpretation would be that the legislature did not intend to eliminate
the limitations established by the courts. First, the purpose of the Act was to reduce
liability insurance costs. To extend liability would not reduce insurance costs. Second,
by not explicitly stating that the Act allows recovery for damages to the product sold
and for economic damages, better statutory interpretation would be that the Act in-
tended to incorporate the prior case law into the definition of the term "products liabil-
ity claim". See also infra note 18 and accompanying text. Finally, the U.C.C., Mo.
REV. STAT. chap. 400 (1986) provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for recovery
of economic loss caused by failure of a product to perform as impliedly or expressly
warranted. The legislature would not have eliminated this statutory scheme without
expressly amending it.
18. The Act defines a strict products liability action as follows:
a claim or portion of a claim in which plaintiff seeks relief in the form of
damages on theory that a defendant is strictly liable in tort for such damages
because:
(1) The defendant, wherever situated in the chain of commerce, trans-
5
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plaintiff must prove that the product was in a defective unreasonably danger-
ous condition when used in a manner reasonably anticipated or "reasonably
foreseeable." The Act thus recognizes that the manufacturer is not an insurer
for all injuries caused by one of its products: the concepts of unreasonable risk
of danger and foreseeability are retained. From a theoretical and practical
standpoint, Missouri courts will look to prior case law for guidance in inter-
preting and resolving unanswered questions presented by the Act.
III. ELEMENTS OF A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE
In Missouri, jury instructions are approved by the supreme court through
an administrative process.19 These approved instructions have the same weight
as principles adopted in a court's opinion and must be used when applicable.2"
Thus, the approved instructions serve as a starting point for a detailed analysis
of Missouri strict products liability law.
A. Seller in the Business of Selling the Product
The first element of any strict products liability case accruing before the
Act's effective date requires proof that the defendant sold the product in ques-
tion and was engaged in the business of selling the product. 2 1 This element is
ferred a product in the course of his business; and
(2) The product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated; and
(3) Either or both of the following:
(a) The product was then in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and the plaintiff
was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition as existed
when the product was sold; or
(b) The product was then unreasonably dangerous when put to a
reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics, and
the plaintiff was damaged as a result of such defective condition as ex-
isted when the product was sold.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.760 (Supp. 1987).
19. Mo. R. Civ. P. 70.
20. Mo. R. Civ. P. 70.02. E.g., Eckert v. Dishon, 617 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981); McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
21. M.A.I. 25.04 (1981) "is intended for use in cases involving a manufacturing
defect and in cases involving a design defect." M.A.I. 25.04 Committee's Comment
(1978 Revision). It provides:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's busi-
ness; and
Second, the (describe product) was then in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and
Third, the (describe product) was used in a manner reasonably anticipated,
and
Fourth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition as
existed when the (describe product) was sold.
M.A.I. 25.05 (1981) applies to a failure to warn case based upon strict products liabil-
6
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basically lifted from the language of Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts (1965). 21 The comments to the Restatement and case law define
a "seller" to include a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor and retailer.23 In
Katz v: Slade,24 the Missouri Supreme Court left unanswered the issue of
whether a "commercial lessor" of a product may be liable as a "seller" under
the theory of strict products liability.
In Katz, the plaintiff was injured while using a golf cart leased to him by
a municipally-owned golf course. The supreme court declined to extend the
doctrine of strict products liability under the circumstances of the case to in-
clude defendants which do not undertake "the mass leasing of [products] as a
part of the overall marketing enterprise. . . . At the same time, the court
discussed favorably cases from other jurisdictions which extended the class of
defendants liable under the theory of strict products liability to include "com-
mercial lessors."26
ity. It provides as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's busi-
ness, and
Second, the (describe product) was then unreasonably dangerous when put to
a reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics, and
Third, defendant did not give an adequate warning of the danger, and
Fourth, the product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated, and
Fifth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of the (describe product) being
sold without an adequate warning.
The first requirement in a strict products liability case whether based on manufactur-
ing defect, defective design or failure to warn requires that the defendant have sold the
product in the course of its business.
22. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it
is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)
applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not brought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. § 402A.
23. E.g., Blevins v. Cushman Motor Co., 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)
(manufacturer and designer); Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780 (Mo.
1977) (en banc) (retailer); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
1969) (wholesaler); Lewis v. Envirotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(distributor). The defendant must be in the business of selling or distributing the prod-
uct. A person re-selling a product he had purchased for his own use is not liable in
strict products liability. He "had not purchased the [product] in question for the pur-
pose of resale or distribution in the stream of commerce." Yokum v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 738 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
24. 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970).
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The court noted that tliose cases involving leases that were made "in the
course of active, full-time marketing as a part of a going business and not on a
casual basis."2 7 The court emphasized that the cases involved "typical com-
mercial-type lessors engaged in the business of distributing goods to the pub-
lic." ' The court concluded that in those cases, as distinguished from the facts
of the Katz case, the lessors were "an integral part of the overall . . . market-
ing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products," and were in a position to recover the cost of protecting the public
by increasing their rental prices.2 9
By distinguishing the facts of Katz from those in the cases extending
strict products liability theory to include commercial lessors, the court did not
address the question of whether it would extend liability to commercial lessors
which are "an integral part of the overall .. .marketing enterprise." The
statements in Katz, however, would certainly support extension of the theory
to commercial lessors. Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc. 0 subsequently
extended the class of defendants liable under the doctrine of strict products
liability to include a "bailor or lessor of a defective product in the usual course
of its business. . .."31
In Gabbard, plaintiff read a newspaper advertisement inviting the public
to pick apples at Stephenson's Orchard. The defendant supplied ladders to
members of the public so that they could pick apples out of the trees in the
orchard. Plaintiff was injured when the ladder he was using tipped over and he
fell to the ground. Plaintiff contended he should be permitted to recover under
the theory of strict products liability enunciated in Keener. The trial court
directed verdict for the defendant, concluding that Katz precluded plaintiff's
recovery under the theory of strict products liability.32
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the doctrine of strict products
liability applied.3 The Gabbard decision has greater implications than exten-
27. Id. at 612.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446,
452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1969)).
30. 565 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
31. Id. at 757.
32. Id. at 756.
33. The court explained its rationale for extending the doctrine:
The accomplishment of the Restatement's stated objectives and the protection
which flows therefrom is not dependent upon a 'sale.' To limit the rule to only
those situations in which there has been an actual sale would be to circum-
scribe the rule to such an extent that its purpose might be defeated. The label
gratuitous furnishing, is not of great significance; the nature of the transac-
tion serves as the basis of strict liability in tort and not the name by which it
is called. In protecting the consumer, the rule of strict liability in tort attaches
to products which are placed in the stream of commerce.
Id. at 758 (quoting Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 114-
17, 258 N.E.2d 681, 686-88 (1970)). While it consistently relates the Katz rationale
for extension of the doctrine to commercial lessors, it does not focus upon the type of
[Vol. 53
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sion of the theory to a "commercial lessor" of a product causing injury, be-
cause the defendant in Gabbard did not lease the product causing the plain-
tiff's injury. Rather, the defendant in Gabbard provided the ladder for use by
others in picking apples. Providing the ladder did not constitute a "sale" or
commercial lease of the ladder. The Gabbard court justified its decision by
focusing upon the type of business-a profit-making enterprise-rather than
upon the nature of the transaction. The court emphasized that Stephenson's
advertised to make a profit, that it had a profit motive and that furnishing
ladders was "interwoven with its sale of apples." 4 The court did not discuss or
analyze whether the ladder had been placed on the market by Stephenson's.
This type of transaction would not appear to involve the type of commer-
cial lease which places a leased product "in the stream of commerce not unlike
a manufacturer or retailer" as discussed in Katz. The Katz Court emphasized
that strict products liability might be extended to include as a defendant the
"typical commercial-type lessors engaged in the business of distributing goods
to the public." It stressed the type of transaction, not the profit motive of the
defendant, in discussing whether to include the municipally-owned golf course
in the class of defendants liable under the theory of strict products liability.
Indeed, the court in Keener instructs that the purpose of strict products liabil-
ity is to insure that the costs of injury are borne by those that put such prod-
ucts on the market. Extending the doctrine to include commercial lessors as
defendants is consistent with the theory. A commercial lessor places the prod-
uct on the market as if it were a manufacturer or seller.
Gabbard misconstrues Katz and would make any profit-making business
strictly liable for any injury caused by a product used in its business. For
example, if an escalator in a department store were found to be defective and
unreasonably dangerous and caused an injury to a business invitee, a store
owner arguably would be strictly liable for the plaintiff's injury under the
Gabbard rationale. The store owner's knowledge of the dangerous condition
and its care in attempting to prevent injuries would be irrelevant; the only
injury would be whether the escalator was in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous and whether the customer was injured by the defective condi-
tion. To extend liability to this type of situation would not promote the pur-
poses of strict products liability, because the store owner in such a situation
was not engaged in the business of distributing, selling or leasing escalators to
the public. He cannot factor in the costs of injuries in its sale of escalators,
because he does not sell escalators. In fact, the store owner would be the
''user" of the product.
While not reviewing the Gabbard decision nor any other decision raising
the issue, the Missouri Supreme Court in dicta acknowledged that "Missouri
transaction involved when discussing those factors supporting application of the theory
to Stephenson's.
34. Id. at 758.
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courts no longer limit application of the theory to sellers alone." s The court
did not discuss how far into the chain of distribution of a product the theory of
strict products liability should extend. The better view would be to limit the
class of defendants liable under the strict products liability doctrine to those
who commercially lease defective unreasonably dangerous products to the pub-
lic.3 6 This type of transaction is more akin to the distribution and sale of a
product contemplated by the Restatement and the Katz court. Those commer-
cial lessors place the product in the stream of commerce to be leased by the
ultimate consumer: their transaction is no different than a sale of the product.
The Act extends the class of defendants subject to liability under the the-
ory of strict products liability to include commercial lessors. It states that a
defendant is strictly liable for damages caused by use of a defective unreason-
ably dangerous product if he "transferred" the product in the course of his
business and if the other elements required by the Act are met.37 By using the
term "transferred" rather than "sold", the Act varies from prior case law.
Accordingly, the court should interpret the provision as legislative endorse-
ment for extension of the theory of strict products liability to include a "com-
mercial lessor" of a product.
One procedural change the Act makes to existing law is the "innocent
seller" provision. 8 This provision ostensibly allows a "seller" in the stream of
35. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (citing
Gabbard). The court did not state that it would extend the theory as far as the Gab-
bard court, but merely observed that Missouri courts have expanded the class of de-
fendants liable under the theory of strict products liability beyond the manufacturer
and retailer. There are limitations as to how far a court will extend the doctrine of
strict products liability. In Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1984) (con-
struing Missouri law), the court refused to extend the class of persons liable under the
doctrine of strict products liability to include a finance company financing a defective
product. The court explained that the defendant Ford Motor Credit Company was not
a distributor of the product in any sense and that its sole function was to finance prod-
ucts. Id. at 1078. The court found that finance. companies were not in the "chain of
distribution" that provides a product to the consumer. Id.
36. See, e.g., Wallace v. Waco Scaffold & Equip. Co., 406 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (applying strict products liability to a commercial lessor of scaffolding
equipment). But see Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 197-98 (8th Cir.
1981) (construing Missouri law) (relying on Gabbard and holding that transfer of rail-
way car from one railroad to another as part of the railroad interchange system was
''commercial lease" subjecting railroad to strict products liability for injury caused by
defect in railway car).
37. See supra note 18.
38. The Act provides:
1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as a seller in the
stream of commerce may be dismissed for a products liability claim as pro-
vided in this section.
2. This section shall apply to any product liability claim in which another
defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly before the court and from
whom total recovery may be had for plaintiff's claim.
3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section within the time
for filing an answer or other responsive pleading unless permitted by the court
[Vol. 53
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commerce to be dismissed from a products liability suit if his liability is based
solely on his status as a seller."' But, if the evidence supports any other theory
of liability, the Act does not allow such dismissal.40 Moreover, the seller may
be dismissed only if another defendant who is not an innocent seller and from
whom the plaintiff may obtain complete discovery is properly before the
court.4
at a later time for good cause shown. The motion shall be accompanied by an
affidavit which shall be made under oath and shall state that the defendant is
aware of no facts or circumstances upon which a verdict might be reached
against him, other than his status as a seller in the stream of commerce.
4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct discovery on the
issues raised in the motion and affidavit. The court for good cause shown, may
extend the time for discovery, and may enter a protective order pursuant to
the rules of civil procedure regarding the scope of discovery on other issues.
5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss under this
section. If the requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of this section are met, and
no party comes forward at such a hearing with evidence of facts which would
render the defendant seeking dismissal under this section liable on some basis
other than his status as a seller in the stream of commerce, the court shall
dismiss without prejudice the claim as to that defendant.
6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to divest a court of
venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time the action was commenced.
A defendant dismissed pursuant to this section shall be considered to remain
a party to such action only for such purposes.
7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocutory until final
disposition of plaintiff's claim by settlement or judgment and may be set aside
for good cause shown at anytime prior to such disposition.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (Supp. 1987).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Under the Act, an innocent seller may be dismissed only if the plaintiff
can obtain complete recovery for the damages from another party which is not an "in-
nocent seller". Thus, in those cases where the only defendants are those that claim they
are innocent sellers, and there is no evidence showing that one of those defendants
would be liable under some other theory, none of the defendants could be dismissed
under this section.
The Act does not explain whether the damages for which total recovery must be
had are limited to compensatory damages or whether they include punitive damages. In
some cases, a defendant which is not an innocent seller may be solvent for purposes of
paying compensatory damages but would be insolvent for purposes of paying punitive
damages (e.g., some defendants will have liability insurance to pay compensatory dam-
ages but will not have insurance to cover any punitive damages award). Unlike the
compensatory damages award, defendants are not jointly and severally liable for puni-
tive damages. The jury assesses punitive damages against each tortfeasor based on that
tortfeasor's misconduct. Therefore, the better rule would be to limit the "damages" for
which a solvent party must be before the court to the compensatory damages.
Another unanswered question is what must be shown to demonstrate that the re-
maining defendants are those from whom total recovery may be had. In those cases in
which the remaining defendants have liability insurance which would pay any compen-
satory damages award, the courts should interpret the phrase, "from whom total recov-
ery may be had for plaintiff's claim", to include the liability insurance. The court
should not look solely at the defendant's financial condition. In those cases in which the
11
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This provision does not change the substantive law relating to an innocent
seller's liability; its effect is only procedural.42 Under the comparative indem-
nity principles enunciated in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead &
Kales Co.,4 3 the innocent seller could always file a third party petition (or
cross-claim) to obtain complete indemnity from the more responsible defend-
ants such as the manufacturer of the defective product. Whitehead & Kales
allows the innocent seller to adjudicate its responsibility for the plaintiff's in-
jury.44 The seller would assert that it was simply a seller in the stream of
commerce and entitled to complete indemnity from the manufacturer. 4 The
purported purpose of the "innocent seller" provision is to allow a seller to be
released at an early stage of the litigation, rather than wait until the comple-
tion of litigation to obtain indemnity. 46
However, this provision will create more uncertainty for the "innocent
seller" regarding its ultimate liability. Under the provision a defendant may
obtain dismissal only if there are no facts or circumstances subjecting him to
liability other than in his status as an innocent seller. After the defendant files
his motion and affidavit for dismissal, discovery is conducted for a minimum of
sixty days on the issues raised by the motion and affidavit.' 7 The parties will
be permitted to discover, for example, all parties' financial condition and lia-
bility insurance coverage;"8 facts relating to the plaintiff's medical condition,
lost wages, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other special damages; 4
remaining defendants do not have insurance, the court should look to the defendant's
net worth to determine whether total recovery may be had from that defendant. Al-
though this measure may not demonstrate liquid assets, it provides a rough measure of
the defendant's financial condition.
42. Because the innocent seller provision is procedural only, it will not apply to
actions filed in federal court.
43. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
44. See infra notes 183-206 for a thorough discussion of Whitehead & Kales.
45. See, e.g., Welkener v. Kirkwood Drug Store Co., 734 S.W.2d 233, 240-45
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (seller in stream of commerce with no other basis for liability
other than in its status as seller entitled to complete indemnity from manufacturer); see
also Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (seller has
claim for indemnity "against the manufacturer of a defective product . . . where the
seller seeking indemnity has no actual knowledge of the defect").
46. Final Report of the Missouri Task Force on Liability Insurance at 26-27
(January 6, 1987) (hereinafter "Final Report").
47. As a practical matter, the discovery will almost never be completed within 60
days. The issues raised by the motion are numerous and complex. See infra notes 48-51
and accompanying text.
48. This information will be discoverable because the court must determine
whether there are non-innocent seller defendants from whom complete recovery may be
had for plaintiff's claim. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
49. This evidence obviously must be discovered before the court can determine
whether complete recovery may be had from the remaining defendants. The court can-
not rely on the prayer for relief, because the Act eliminated the prayer for relief from
the petition. Mo. REv. STAT. § 509.050.1(2) (Supp. 1987). A plaintiff's attorney should
hesitate before providing a "ball park" figure of the compensatory damages his client
will seek and permitting the dismissal of a defendant under this section. Often a plain-
[Vol. 53
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facts regarding any alteration the moving defendant made or should have
made to the product; and facts demonstrating any notice of danger to the mov-
ing defendant. 50 After completion of this stage of discovery, any party may
move for a hearing on the motion. 51
If any party presents evidence which would make the movant liable under
any theory other than in his status as seller, the motion for dismissal must be
denied. 52 Because the Act does not establish a standard of proof permitting
dismissal, a court should follow the summary judgment standard. The movant
will be dismissed only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact"
regarding his liability under any other theory of recovery.53 The party oppos-
ing dismissal may not rest upon mere allegations but must present specific
facts showing the moving party could be liable on some other theory of recov-
ery.54 Unlike the motion for summary judgment, once the movant files his
motion and affidavit, the nonmovants have the burden of presenting evidence
making the movant liable on some other theory. The movant would still have
the burden of demonstrating that plaintiff could obtain complete recovery
from the other defendants. If there is a genuine issue of material fact on any
of the issues, the movant's motion must be denied.
Even if the motion is granted, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
and is interlocutory until final disposition by settlement or judgment.55 It may
be set aside at any time for good cause shown. 56 In other words, if any party
presents evidence which would make the dismissed defendant liable on any
other theory, the dismissed defendant would again be made a party to the
litigation. Even when final disposition occurs and the order of dismissal be-
comes final, the Act only allows a dismissal without prejudice.57
tiff's damages will increase from the time the suit is filed to the time of trial because of
unforeseen medical complications or unknown permanency of disability.
50. These facts could create a duty to warn, test or remedy under which the
moving party could be liable.
51. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (Supp. 1987). As a practical matter, about the
only remaining discovery would be on the claim that the product is unreasonably dan-
gerous and on any punitive damages claims against the remaining defendants.
52. Id.
53. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.04(c).
54. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (Supp. 1987); see Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.04(e).
55. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (Supp. 1987). Because the order is interlocutory,
an interesting issue arises as to whether federal courts would obtain diversity jurisdic-
tion in those cases in which a defendant defeating diversity was dismissed.
56. Id.
57. This anomalous result is required by the Act. The order of dismissal without
prejudice is interlocutory. Upon disposition, it becomes a final order of dismissal with-
out prejudice. A party will rarely move for dismissal under Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762
(Supp. 1987) because the expense of discovery would be enormous for obtaining a dis-
missal without prejudice. The innocent seller should always seek dismissal based upon
Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.04, because the order of dismissal in that section would be with
prejudice to the right to any party to bring another action. The legislature probably
intended that the order of dismissal without prejudice under the innocent seller provi-
sion becomes an order of dismissal with prejudice upon disposition of the underlying
1988]
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At any time within the statutory limitations period, a plaintiff may file
another action against the dismissed defendant if facts arise showing the dis-
missed defendant would be liable on another theory. Similarly, the other de-
fendants may seek contribution from the dismissed defendant if facts arise
showing that he would be liable for contributions on any theory other than in
his status as seller.58 If the "innocent seller" had remained a defendant in the
original action rather than obtaining dismissal under this provision, his possi-
bility of liability would have ended. He would have had a final adjudication of
his responsibility for the plaintiff's injury and of his relative contribution, if
any, for the plaintiff's injury.
The provision also fails to acknowledge the undefined class of transferors;
it only allows dismissal of innocent "sellers". As previously discussed, the leg-
islature incorporated the term "transferred" in the Act to endorse inclusion of
the commercial lessor in the class of defendants liable under strict products
liability.59 The reason for including the commercial lessor is because the com-
mercial lease transaction is no different than the sale of the product.6 0 There is
no rational basis for not including the innocent transferor in the class of those
that may obtain dismissal under this section of the Act. The innocent trans-
feror-by legislative amendment or judicial interpretation-should be consid-
ered an innocent seller for purposes of obtaining dismissal under this provision.
As a practical matter, discovery under the "innocent seller" provision
would involve all those matters that would be required for obtaining a sum-
mary judgment on its liability. In addition, discovery costs will be greater than
discovery costs of seeking a summary judgment on liability, because the de-
fendant moving for dismissal under the innocent seller provision would need to
demonstrate the extent of the plaintiff's damages and the financial status of
the remaining defendants. Under a motion for summary judgment on the issue
of liability, a defendant would not need to discover that information. Accord-
ingly, a defendant should carefully consider whether the "innocent seller" pro-
vision offers him any advantages before seeking dismissal. In most cases, the
defendant probably would be better served to seek discovery on the issues
which would allow him to move for a summary judgment under Supreme
Court Rule 74.04 on the issues of liability and contribution.
action. Because the Act is not clear on this issue, the legislature should amend Mo.
REv. STAT. § 537.762 (Supp. 1987) to state that the dismissal becomes a dismissal with
prejudice upon the disposition of the underlying case by adjudication or settlement.
58. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc). If the Act permitted the dismissal to be with prejudice, the other defendants
could not seek contribution; an adjudication would have occurred that the defendants
are not joint tortfeasors.
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B. Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition at the Time of Sale
The second element of a strict products liability action requires the plain-
tiff to prove that the product at the time of sale "was then in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use.' 61
This requirement applies in cases alleging a manufacturing defect, design de-
fect or defect for failing to warn.62 Stated otherwise, plaintiff must show that
the defective unreasonably dangerous condition "existed when the [product]
left the manufacturer's [or seller's] control and entered the stream of com-
merce. . ... 13a This requirement originated from the comments to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts Section 402A (1965).64
Although the requirement might seem insurmountable, Missouri courts
allow a plaintiff to prove the existence of a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous at the time of sale through circumstantial evidence. For example,
the product need not be new to establish that the defective condition existed at
the time of sale. Evidence showing the product has not undergone alterations,
repairs or modifications since the sale has been sufficient in some cases to
prove circumstantially that the defective unreasonably dangerous condition ex-
isted at the time of sale.6 5 An expert's testimony can provide the proof re-
61. M.A.I. 25.04 (1981).
62. See supra note 21.
63. Brissette v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 479 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972); see also Fahy v. Dresser Indust., Inc., 740 S.W.2d at 639-40; Lewis v. En-
virotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Patterson v. Foster Forbes
Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Coulter v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
622 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982).
A related issue is whether a plaintiff may sue a distributor or seller of a used
product based on strict products liability. The plaintiff would claim that the seller
should be liable for selling a defective product and whether the product is new or used
should be irrelevant. Missouri courts have not addressed the issue. See, e.g., Williams
v. Nuckolls, 644 S.W.2d 670, 674 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). But cf. Yokum v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 738 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (one selling used product,
but not a distributor of used products on ongoing basis, not liable in products liability).
64. See supra note 22. Comment g to the Restatement emphasizes that "[tihe
burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the
hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be
produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not
sustained." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
65. Helm v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 723 S.W.2d 465, 468-69 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 899-900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Wadlow v. Linder Homes, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Coulter v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d 421, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
906 (1982); Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); Williams v. Deere & Co., 598 S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
For example, in Williams v. Deere & Co., plaintiff alleged a tractor had a defec-
tive gear shift. The court noted that the fact that the tractor was two years old did not
preclude recovery. The court commented that in the circumstances of the case, the gear
shift should have lasted more than two years absent proof of alteration or unreasonable
interference. The tractor's owner and the defendant's service manager had testified
19881
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quired for a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous at the time
of sale, 6 although such expert testimony is required only in those cases involv-
that, to their knowledge, the tractor had not undergone any substantial alteration since
its manufacture and sale. Williams, 598 S.W.2d at 612-13.
Other facts may adversely affect the plaintiff's ability to meet his burden of proof.
Proof may be complicated by the presence of an intermediary seller or sellers (distribu-
tor and/or dealer). Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 494 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) ("When on the evidence it appears equally probable that the defect has devel-
oped in the hands of the dealer, the plaintiff has not made out a case of strict liability,
or even negligence, against any prior party."). The passage of time, the product's age,
and the product's use without incident increases the plaintiff's difficulty of establishing
a defect at the time of manufacture or sale. In Williams v. Nuckolls, 644 S.W.2d 670
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982), for example, plaintiff sued the seller of a 10-year old car with
92,000 miles at the time of sale. Plaintiff alleged that the product was defective be-
cause the brakes had failed after he had driven it a total of four miles. The court
concluded plaintiff had presented insufficient evidence that a defect cognizable under
strict products liability existed at the time of sale. The court ruled that the inference of
sudden failure from age was as compelling as plaintiff's claim of a pre-existing defect:
Here, the evidence does not tend to exclude reasonable conclusions other than
the existence of a defect at the time of the sale. Under the circumstances of
this case, which include the age and mileage of the automobile plus the sud-
denness of the brake failure, resort to speculation and conjecture would be
required to determine both the existence and the discoverability at the time of
sale of whatever defective condition may have caused the brake failure.
"Evidence which points equally to a cause for which the defendants are
responsible and to one for which the defendants are not responsible is not
sufficient to make a case for submission to a jury."
Id. at 673 (quoting Hale v. Advance Abrasive Co., 520 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975)). See also Glass v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 618 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Mo.
1985), affid, 789 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1986) (construing Missouri law) (to hold manu-
facturer liable for unavoidable accident or ordinary wear and tear would be to place
manufacturer or seller in place of an insurer, which is not allowed under Missouri law);
Shepard v. Ford Motor Co., 457 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff failed to
establish a defect at the time the truck was manufactured by Ford despite allegations
that the accident was caused by defective U-Bolts). While these cases state that plain-
tiff may rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove defect, they also demonstrate that
factors such as the passage of time, normal wear and tear, and plaintiff's failure to
maintain the product will preclude a plaintiff from establishing a defect existing at the
time of the product's manufacture and sale. But cf. Commercial Distrib. Center, Inc. v.
St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing lower
court's directed verdict for defendant and holding that expert's testimony that the
product as designed created a "potential for accelerated corrosion", which was the cas-
ual defect, was sufficient to submit issue of defect to jury).
66. See, e.g., Commercial Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689
S.W.2d 664, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Coulter v. Michelin Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d
421, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982); Brissette v. Milner
Chevrolet Co., 479 S.W.2d 176, 181-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); see also Siebern v. Mis-
souri-Illinois Tractor & Equip., 711 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (expert
testimony on defectiveness necessary because the requirement of design, the definition
of danger and what might be anticipated in the operation of very large, very powerful
equipment are outside experience of the average juror).
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ing complex design issues. 67 Conversely, proof that the product has been al-
tered since the time of sale and that the alteration is unforeseeable precludes
an action against the manufacturer or seller.68 Even when the product altera-
tion was foreseeable, a manufacturer is not liable if the alteration made an
otherwise safe product unsafe.6 9 An alteration to the product which does not
create the unreasonably dangerous condition causing the plaintiff's injury,
however, does not relieve the manufacturer or seller of liability for injury
caused by a defective unreasonably dangerous product.1 0
The Act should not change this analysis. It incorporates verbatim the lan-
guage of M.A.I. 25.04.7 ' Missouri courts should continue to require proof by
direct or circumstantial evidence that the defective unreasonably dangerous
condition of the product existed at the time the product left the control of the
manufacturer, seller or distributor.
C. Defective Condition Unreasonably Dangerous
Plaintiff must prove in a case alleging defective design that the product at
the time of sale was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when
put to a reasonably anticipated use." In a case alleging failure to warn, plain-
tiff must prove that at the time of sale the product was "unreasonably danger-
ous when put to a reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its charac-
teristics." Thus, a failure to warn claim requires the additional proof that the
product is unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use
"without knowledge of its characteristics." This difference is important be-
67. See, e.g., Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Wadlow v. Lindner Homes, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Moslander v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 628 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Williams
v. Deere & Co., 598 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Weatherford v. H.K.
Porter, Inc., 560 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Winters v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 554 S.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). For example, in Patterson v. Foster
Forbes Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970), a baby bottle exploded. The
court held that the force of the explosion made it reasonable to infer that the explosion
was caused by a defect in physical composition of the bottle rather than something else.
68. Compare, e.g., Glass v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 789 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1986)
(construing Missouri law) (safety features of combine had been removed since the time
of sale and combine's engine had been completely rebuilt) with Duke v. Gulf & West-
ern Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (alteration in punch press
was foreseeable in light of evidence showing that 5 % of all punch presses had been
altered and that the defendant was aware of the alterations) and Vanskike v. ACF
Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982),
(construing Missouri law) ("subsequent changes or alterations in the product do not
relieve the manufacturer of strict liability if the changes were foreseeable and the
changes do not unforeseeably render the product unsafe").
69. Gomez v. Clark Equip. Co., 743 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
70. See, e.g., Fahy v. Dresser Indust., Inc., 740 S.W.2d at 639-70; Jarrell v. Fort
Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
71. Compare supra note 18 with supra note 22.
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cause it makes recovery based on a design defect and for failure to warn in-
consistent. This Section will discuss how courts should determine that a prod-
uct is "unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use" and
will explore the inconsistencies between the action based on defective design
and the one based on failure to warn adequately.
1. Defective Design
What constitutes a defective design unreasonably dangerous to the user
has perplexed Missouri courts since the adoption of strict products liability.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Lietz v. Snyder Manufacturing Co.72 stated
that there is a distinction between the defective condition of the product and
the dangerous character of the product when put to a reasonably anticipated
use. After the court made this statement, one commentator opined that a
plaintiff must prove both that the product is defective and that it is unreasona-
bly dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use."
Use of the term "defective condition" and requiring proof in addition to
proof that the product is unreasonably dangerous has confused Missouri juries
in design defect cases. 4 This confusion may result from the dual meaning that
can be associated with the term "defective condition." "Defective condition"
has a common meaning outside the law of strict products liability which may
not coincide with the meaning used in strict products liability cases. For exam-
ple, a jury might have difficulty understanding how a product can be "defec-
tive" when it has been manufactured and designed exactly as the manufac-
turer intended.
Some Missouri courts of appeal recognized that "defective condition" has
little independent meaning in a strict products liability case where the product
is manufactured precisely as it was designed to be manufactured.75 Rather
than requiring proof in a design defect case that the product is both defective
and unreasonably dangerous, the better approach would be to create a unitary
standard. In a design defect case, therefore, a product would be defectively
designed if it is in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user when put to
a reasonably anticipated use. Only proof on the unreasonable dangerousness of
the product would be required. Both requirements-proof of defect and proof
that the product is unreasonably dangerous as manufactured-should be in-
cluded in a manufacturing defects case. The flaw in the product in a manufac-
72. 475 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Mo. 1970).
73. 1 MISSOURI TORT LAW, Products Liability § 8.7, at 8-7 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Wallace v. Waco Scafford & Equip. Co., 606 S.W.2d 480, 482
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (the jury asked if it should consider "safety of design" in deter-
mining "defective condition" and the judge refused to clarify the instruction); Rinker v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (the jury requested a
definition of the word "defective" and the trial judge refused to clarify the term).
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turing defect case is that the product was not manufactured according to de-
sign specifications. This is conceptually different from a design defect flaw, in
which the product is manufactured in accordance with its intended design but
is nonetheless defective.
In Nesselrode, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the unitary standard
for design defect cases and removed some of the confusion created by the
Lietz decision. The court explained:
To establish liability in a design defect case, the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous and
therefore "defective," and that the demonstrated defect caused his injuries.
Though obviously abbreviated, the foregoing explanation describes the heart
and soul of a strict tort liability design defect case-unreasonable danger and
causation.7 6
To ensure that lower courts do not require proof on both defect and unreason-
able dangerousness, the court emphasized that "[u]nder Missouri's law of
strict tort liability, a product's design is deemed defective, for purposes of im-
posing liability, when it is shown by a preponderance of evidence that the de-
sign renders the product unreasonably dangerous."' 77 Thus, after Nesselrode, a
plaintiff in a design defect case must prove that the product was "unreasona-
bly dangerous" when put to a reasonably anticipated use. Separate proof on
defectiveness is not required.78
Whether a product is unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably
anticipated use has generated a great amount of discussion by Missouri courts.
Because defect in a design defect case only requires proof that the product was
unreasonably dangerous, this term will be discussed with even more frequency
by the courts. Missouri courts of appeal before Nesselrode sometimes men-
tioned the Restatement's "consumer expectation" standard when discussing
whether a product was unreasonably dangerous."9 The consumer expectation
standard requires a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous if it
is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it.80 In Aronson's Men's Store, Inc. v. Pot-
ter Electric Signal, Inc.,81 the Missouri Supreme Court also discussed the Re-
statement's consumer expectations test but did not endorse it. More recently in
Nesselrode, the supreme court stressed that it had not held that "the standard
76. 707 S.W.2d 371, 375-76 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 377 (footnotes omitted).
78. For a discussion of the necessity of defining the term, "unreasonably danger-
ous," in light of its increased importance in a design defect case, see infra notes 79-93.
Courts should continue to require separate proof of defectiveness and of the unreasona-
bly dangerous condition or character of the product in a manufacturing defect case.
79. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom., Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); Brawner v. Liberty Indus.,
573 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Crysts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
81. 632 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
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of defectiveness was rooted only in the expectations of the ordinary
consumer."
82
Although stressing that the consumer expectation standard is not the only
standard of defectiveness, the Nesselrode court did not endorse an applicable
standard. Neither party had raised the issue on appeal, and the court chose
not to decide the question.8 3 Nevertheless, the court's discussion of the Nes-
selrode case and of plaintiff's proof that the product was unreasonably danger-
ous when put to a reasonably anticipated use indicates that the court would
adopt the risk-utility test.
The risk-utility test involves a balance of the risk or danger in using the
product with the utility or usefulness of the product.84 This test departs from
the "consumer expectation" model in that it allows the jury to look at a wide
range of factors in determining whether the product is "unreasonably danger-
ous" as designed. The factors include the need served by the product or its
usefulness; the availability (technological and economic feasibility) of a substi-
tute product meeting the same needs which is not as unsafe; the ability to
eliminate unsafe aspects of the design without impairing its usefulness; the
user's anticipated awareness (consumer expectation) of the danger inherent in
use of the product; the likelihood that the product will cause injury compared
with the probable seriousness of the injury" and the obviousness of the danger
82. 707 S.W.2d at 377-78 n.10 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 378.
84. Deans Keeton and Wade advocate the risk-utility test. Each has developed a
list of factors he believes the jury should balance as part of its decision-making process.
See, e.g., Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of
Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 589-91 (1980); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
85. Plaintiffs often offer evidence of other accidents in an attempt to prove the
product is unreasonably dangerous. Because this type of evidence is extremely prejudi-
cial, injects issues involving other cases not before the court and seldom can provide an
inference of defect, the court must exercise strict control over admission of other acci-
dents evidence. Notice of danger is not an issue under Missouri strict products liability
law whether the action is based on defective design or failure to warn. E.g., Nesselrode
v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 382-83 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). Thus,
evidence of other accidents would be admissible only on the issue of foreseeable use and
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous.
Before any evidence of an other accident is admissible, a plaintiff must prove that
the proffered other accident is substantially similar to his accident. E.g., Lewy v. Rem-
ington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 1988) (construing Missouri law); Hale
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985) (construing
Missouri law); Keller v. International Harvester Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); cf. Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 904-05 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that trial court's refusal to admit experimental evidence proper and
stating that such tests are admissible only when conducted under conditions substan-
tially similar to conditions existing at time of occurrence giving rise to suit; when ad-
mitted to show a product's tendency to produce an effect of a given character, "there
must be substantial similarity in circumstances as might affect the result in question").
Before the evidence is admissible, the proponent must provide foundational facts which
show with reasonable certainty that other possible causes of the other accident were not
[Vol. 53
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to the user (such as with a knife)."6 The majority in Nesselrode expressed
concern that use of an external standard to define the term "unreasonably
involved. Cf. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (if
injury may have resulted from one of two causes, plaintiff must show with reasonable
certainty that cause for which defendant is liable produced the result). Absent that
proof, no evidence of other accidents is admissible.
In Keller, the court of appeals held the trial court properly excluded evidence of
other accidents involving International Harvester products because plaintiff had failed
to establish that the other accidents were substantially similar to his accident. Keller,
648 S.W.2d at 589. The proffer was insufficient because there was no evidence that the
other accidents involved the same model and product design, the same causal design
defect and the same conditions and terrain of use. Id. See also Lewy v. Remington
Arms Co., 836 F.2d at 1108 (holding trial court properly admitted evidence of other
accidents involving the same model and product design, same circumstances and same
alleged causal defect; also holding trial court improperly admitted evidence of other
accidents involving differently designed product and different causal defect). Similarly,
in Hale, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court for admitting evidence of other
accidents because there was an "insufficient showing of similarity." Hale, 756 F.2d at
1332.
Plaintiffs also often seek to introduce statistical evidence relating to accident rates
of products. This evidence is highly suspect, because it oversimplifies the circumstances
surrounding the accidents contained within the data. Statistical evidence of this type
should be reviewed carefully by the trial court, comparing prejudice against relevancy
and quality of proof. The proponent must establish relevancy and an adequate founda-
tion by showing that the statistics involve comparable circumstances. Siebern v. Mis-
souri-Illinois Tractor & Equip., 711 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Sturm v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 F. Supp. 144 (W.D. Mo. 1982), afl'd, 732 F.2d 161
(8th Cir. 1984)).
The court must, therefore, carefully analyze the facts and circumstances of plain-
tiff's accident, determine the alleged causal defect, ascertain what model and product is
involved, and eliminate those accidents occurring after the plaintiffs accident. Once the
court has made this determination, plaintiff must produce evidence showing that the
proffered other accidents meet these criteria of substantial similarity before the other
accidents are admissible. Next, the court must rule out other possible causes of the
accident. This would require the plaintiff to show for each other proffered accident that
the cause for which the defendant is responsible was more likely than not the cause of
the other accident. See Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246. Absent that proof, the other accident
could have been caused by plaintiffs unforeseeable misuse or abuse of the product, for
example. It would not provide any inference that-a defect in the product was responsi-
ble for causing the other accident. These are minimal requirements and are not in-
tended to be a comprehensive statement of all factors a court should require before
allowing evidence of other accidents to be introduced to the jury.
Because of the time consuming process required to establish this foundation, a
court should hold evidentiary hearings before trial outside the presence of the jury. See,
e.g., Rexroad v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982). Once the minimal foundation is established, the court
must determine what evidence may be introduced. That evidence should be limited to a
statement of the claimant involved, the causal defect, the model and design of product,
and the similar circumstances and conditions of use. The defendant must be given the
opportunity to rebut this evidence by demonstrating that other potential causes pro-
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dangerous" by the giving of abstract, abstruse standards, impossible to comply
with, only perpetuates the mystical trial by ordeal and may conceal a hook in
a transcendental lure that will snag an appellate court."' 87 Nevertheless, in
discussing whether the plaintiff had established that the defendant's product
was unreasonably dangerous, the court used the risk-utility test in its analysis.
Nesselrode involved a wrongful death action in which an airplane crashed
shortly after takeoff. The pilot and the three passengers were killed. Plaintiff
contended that two important flight components controlling the upward and
downward movement of the airplane, the left and right actuators, were defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous as designed. The design of the actuators al-
lowed them to be installed incorrectly, the right actuator in the left position
and the left actuator in the right position. In Nesselrode, the actuators were
installed in the wrong positions. Reversing the placement of the actuators
causes the airplane to react in the opposite direction of the way it was in-
tended to act: when attempting to climb, the nose of the plane was instead
forced downward. The jury in Nesselrode returned a verdict of $1,500,000,
and defendant appealed arguing that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that
the product was unreasonably dangerous as designed.
In discussing the evidence supporting plaintiff's position, the Nesselrode
court noted that alternative designs were feasible and available. The industry
design standard existing at the time the actuators were designed required one
to "design critical flight parts in a way which makes it physically impossible to
install them or assemble them in any way but the right way." 88 The court
pointed out that FAA licensed airframe and power plant mechanics testified
that it was not obvious by physical inspection to determine the right actuator
from the left actuator.8 9 The danger in switching the actuators during installa-
tion was not obvious. Furthermore, the court noted that the mechanics, the
consumer or user of the product, expected that the defendant had designed the
product according to the industry design standard precluding incorrect instal-
lation. The plaintiff also introduced evidence that the product could have been
designed with safety features precluding incorrect installation without affect-
ing the actuators' performance.9
By focusing its discussion on the availability and feasibility of an alterna-
tive design, on the unobviousness of incorrect installation, on the capability to
redesign the actuators so as to prevent incorrect installation without impairing
the product's usefulness, and on the user's expectation that the product had
been designed to preclude incorrect installation, the Nesselrode court dis-
cussed the proof from a risk-utility standard. Accordingly, if the issue were to
be raised, the court would probably adopt a risk-utility test.9"
87. 707 S.W.2d at 378 (court's emphasis) (quoting Green, Strict Liability Under
Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (1976)).
88. Id. at 379.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 380.
91. Adoption of the risk-utility test would be consistent with the approach devel-
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To find that a product is unreasonably dangerous, the jury must have
some standard against which to compare the product. The concept of unrea-
sonableness assumes that there is a standard of reasonableness against which
one can determine whether the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed.
Without a standard or instruction to guide the jury, confusion will reign.
Lower courts should begin to define by instruction the term, "unreasonably
dangerous," for the jury.92
Because the supreme court expressed concern in Nesselrode about limit-
ing the jury's consideration of factors to include in its determination of
oping in the lower courts and in the federal courts' interpretation of Missouri law. The
court in Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 410-13 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) discussed at length the risk-utility approach and the benefit of using the standard
in a complex case, although finding it unnecessary to adopt the approach in a techno-
logically simple case. In Limbocher v. Ford Motor Co., 619 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981), the court upheld a verdict for defendant, noting that an expert for the
plaintiff had testified that the tractor was dangerous and not reasonably safe because it
was not equipped with a slope indicator. The defendant's expert had testified that such
a device was not available on the market at the time of sale. In Hurt v. General Motors
Co., 553 F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir. 1977) (construing Missouri law), the court empha-
sized that while car manufacturers could design and build cars with the features of an
army tank, "the average and reasonable automobile user desires only a reasonable,
safe, economical form of motor transportation. No greater burden of design-perform-
ance ought to be imposed upon automobile manufacturers by either judge or jury." The
manufacturer in Hurt was allowed to offer evidence that it had complied with federal
government regulations and standards governing the installation of seat belts in motor
vehicles at the time of manufacture.
In Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973) (con-
struing Missouri law), the court noted that "[t]he comparative design with similar and
competitive machinery in the field, alternative designs and post-accident modification
of the machine, the frequency or infrequency of use of the same product without mis-
hap, and the relative cost and feasibility in adopting other designs are all relevant to
proof of defective design." See also McGowne v. Challenge Cooke Bros., Inc., 672 F.2d
652, 663 (8th Cir. 1982) (construing Missouri law) (obviousness of defect or danger is
material to issue of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous); Polk v. Ford Motor
Co., 529 F.2d 259, 263-66 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976) (constru-
ing Missouri law) (availability of alternative designs in other vehicles at the time of
manufacture was relevant); Braun v. General Motors Corp., 579 S.W.2d 766, 770
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (evidence admitted that manufacturer's design met and exceeded
the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards in effect at the time of manufacture).
92. In dicta, the court of appeals in Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666
S.W.2d 828, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), stated that to define the terms "defective" and
"unreasonably dangerous" would be an impermissible deviation from M.A.I. 25.04
(1981). The court reasoned that where an approved instruction is applicable, "its use is
mandatory and failure to use the mandatory instruction is presumed to be prejudicial
error." Id. (citing Eckert v. Dishon, 617 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) and
McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). The court, how-
ever, mistakenly assumes that because M.A.I. 25.04 (1981) must be given in a strict
products liability action that an additional instruction defining the term "unreasonably
dangerous" cannot be given. In light of the supreme court's decision in Nesselrode, one
must conclude that the Jarrell court is wrong and that an instruction should be given
to provide guidance to the jury.
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whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, lower courts should define the
term, "unreasonably dangerous," in the following manner: in determining
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, you should consider whether the
usefulness of the product is outweighed by the risk of the product when put to
a reasonably anticipated use."3 This instruction would provide a framework for
the jury in deciding whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous." The use-
fulness of the product would be compared with its risk when put to a reasona-
bly anticipated use. Using the following language, for example, the court
would then instruct the jury that they may consider, "among other things, the
following factors in [their] decision as to whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous," and list those factors the litigants believe should be considered by
the jury for a particular case. By not limiting factors to consider in the equa-
tion, the instruction would leave open for future development the specific fac-
tors a jury might consider in reaching a decision. For an individual case, coun-
sel would be permitted to argue the specific factors relevant to the
determination of that case.
The Act does not eliminate the need to adopt an instruction defining the
term "unreasonably dangerous." The Act incorporates verbatim the language
contained in M.A.I. 25.04 that the jury must find the product in a defective
condition "unreasonably dangerous" to the user. Courts should provide guid-
ance to the jury so that they have a decisional framework in which to deter-
mine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Providing an instruction
defining the term "unreasonably dangerous" also would effectuate the legisla-
ture's intent in passing the Act-to eliminate some of the uncertainty in Mis-
souri's strict products liability law.
An important adjunct to defining the term "unreasonably dangerous"
concerns the type of evidence admissible both to prove that the product was
unreasonably dangerous as designed and to rebut plaintiff's proof. One such
issue is state of the art evidence. Under the risk-utility standard, the plaintiff
cannot introduce evidence of an alternative design which was not feasible at
the time of manufacture. Similarly, a defendant should not be held to a state
of the art that was not technologically feasible or knowable at the time the
product was made.
To impose liability without reference to technological feasibility at the
time of the product's manufacture would be to impose absolute liability.9 4
Missouri law does not make the manufacturer absolutely liable for injuries
caused by use of its products. Nevertheless, the supreme court in Elmore v.
93. Parties should request this instruction to preserve the issue on appeal. "There
is a duty to offer a clarifying or amplifying instruction where the litigant believes the
situation is not clearly or sufficiently hypothesized." Keller v. International Harvester
Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
94. See generally Absolute Liability, supra note 11, at 443-47. Missouri courts
claim that a defendant is not absolutely liable for injuries caused by use of their prod-
uct. See supra notes 9-12.
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Owens-Illinois, Inc.,9 5 held that "state of the art evidence has no bearing on
the outcome of a strict liability claim."9 86 This statement seems to hold a de-
fendant absolutely liable for the sale of a defective product even where it was
technologically impossible for the defendant to design and manufacture an al-
ternative product which could provide the same utility more safely. However,
a close reading of the case shows the court did not intend such an expansive
interpretation.
The court did not specifically discuss the types of evidence which might
be considered "state of the art" evidence, At least three types of evidence
might be so classified: custom and practice evidence, evidence of what was
technologically feasible, and evidence that discovery of the defect was techno-
logically infeasible.9 7 Custom and practice evidence relates to the standard of
care followed by others in the industry in the design of similar products.9 8
Technological feasibility is not concerned with the industry practice. It focuses
upon whether, given the scientific conditions existing at the time of the prod-
uct's manufacture and sale, one could have designed the product any differ-
ently to avoid the danger.9 9 Impossibility of discovering the defect relates to
whether the defendant or the industries could know that the danger existed.10 0
In Elmore, the defendants contended that under the state of the art at the
time the product was manufactured, the company was not and could not have
been aware of the product's danger.101 The only issue before the court was the
company's claim that the product could not be considered defective as
designed in that its inability to know the danger precluded a finding of defec-
tive design. In this context, the court held that evidence of state of the art was
irrelevant in a design defect case, explaining that "[t]he manufacturer's stan-
dard of care is irrelevant because it relates to the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's design choice; fault is an irrelevant consideration on the issue of
liability in the strict liability context."102 The court did not discuss feasibility
as an issue nor the admissibility of the excluded evidence on the issue of
whether the product was being used in a reasonably anticipated use. 03 Thus,
95. 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
96. Id. at 438.
97. See generally Absolute Liability, supra note 11, at 444.
98. Id. at 443-44; see, e.g., Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884,
885-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
99. Absolute Liability, supra note 11, at 444.
100. Id.
101. 673 S.W.2d at 437.
102. Id. at 438.
103. See, e.g., Adams v. Fuqua Indust., Inc., 820 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1987) (con-
struing Missouri law) (reversing trial court for precluding defendant from introducing
evidence of the infeasibility of alternative designs at time of product manufacture). In
Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884, 885-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984),
however, the court of appeals mistakenly applied Elmore. The court held that evidence
relating to industry standards was not admissible to rebut plaintiff's evidence that the
defendant's product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 886.
The supreme court's decisions demonstrate that much of the evidence regarding
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the Elmore court's prohibition on introduction of state of the art evidence
should be limited to evidence relating to knowledge of the danger, not the
feasibility of manufacturing an alternative design.10 4
This analysis is supported by Nesselrode. In Nesselrode, the defect in the
product was shown by evidence of industry standards (custom and practice)
existing at the time the product was manufactured.20 5 Technological feasibility
of alternative designs at the time of manufacture also provided proof of de-
fect.106 Plaintiff offered evidence of consumer expectation at the time of the
product's sale regarding use of the product to show the product was unreason-
ably dangerous as sold.1
0 7
Under Missouri law, the jury must focus on the time the product was
manufactured to determine whether it is in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user. 0 8 One factor the jury may consider is the availability
and feasibility of alternative designs at the time of the product's manufacture.
A plaintiff should not be permitted to introduce evidence of alternative designs
that were not technologically feasible at the time the product was manufac-
tured.'09 Conversely, in rebuttal to plaintiff's claim that the product as
the custom and practice of the industry and the technological impossibility of designing
an alternative product is relevant to the unreasonable dangerousness of the product and
to whether the plaintiff was using the product in a reasonably anticipated use. The
evidence relates to the product's character or condition and to the foreseeable use of
the product, not the foreseeability of harm. See infra notes 130-141 and accompanying
text. The court recently explained in Nesselrode:
Although the negligence-rooted concept of fault has little if any theoretical
utility in the law of strict tort liability, proximate causation and foreseeability
are concepts that factor into the calculus of liability in a strict tort liability
action. Foreseeability, however is a determinant of use: it is not a determinant
of harm.
707 S.W.2d at 375 n.4 (emphasis added). Thus, the evidence would be admissible as
relating to the foreseeability of product use. Obviously, if it was the custom and prac-
tice to use a product a certain way, the foreseeability of an unintended or unknown use
would be limited. The evidence would be admissible so that the jury could determine
whether the plaintiff had met his burden on foreseeability of use.
104. The Elmore court's prohibition on admissibility of this evidence has been
overruled by the Act in a case based on strict products liability failure to warn. See
infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
105. 707 S.W.2d at 379-80.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
109. Admissibility of post-accident changes in allegedly defective products or
warnings might be admissible in strict products liability actions on the issue of techno-
logical feasibility. Missouri courts have not addressed the issue. See, e.g., Keller v.
International Harvester Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584, 588 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Tennis
v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). Courts should
not allow a plaintiff to introduce any evidence of post-accident changes unless the
changes were sufficiently near in time so as to provide an inference of feasibility at the
time of the product's manufacture and sale. In addition, the changes should be related
to the causal defect.
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designed was unreasonably dangerous, a defendant may introduce evidence
that alternative designs were not technologically feasible at the time the prod-
uct was manufactured and sold.
The Act recognizes that this type of evidence is admissible. The Act de-
fines state of the art evidence---consistent with Elmore-to mean that the dan-
gerous nature of the product was not known and could not reasonably have
been discovered at the time the product was placed into the stream of com-
merce."10 The Task Force specifically states in its section relating to state of
the art evidence that the proposed change is not intended to affect the feasibil-
ity defense."' Thus, courts should continue to preclude a plaintiff from intro-
ducing evidence of alternative designs technologically unavailable at the time
of the product's manufacture and sale. Courts should allow defendants to in-
troduce evidence that alternative designs were not technologically feasible.
2. Failure to Warn
In Missouri, a plaintiff can bring his failure to warn case under a theory
of negligence"' or under the theory of strict products liability."' Under the
A good example of this limitation is Roth v. Black & Decker U.S. Inc., 737 F.2d
779, 782 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (decided under Fed. R. Evid. 407). The product injuring
plaintiff was manufactured in 1975. In 1974, the company designed a modification
which was not incorporated in the product until 1976. The court found the evidence of
design change admissible on the issue of whether alternative safer designs were techno-
logically feasible at the time of the product's sale in 1975.
110. The Act provides:
1. As used in this section, "state of the art means that the dangerous nature
of the product was not known and could not reasonably be discovered at the
time the product was placed in the stream of commerce.
2. The state of the art shall be a complete defense and relevant evidence
only in an action based upon strict liability for failure to warn of the danger-
ous condition of a product. This defense shall be pleaded as an affirmative
defense and the party asserting it shall have the burden of proof.
4. This section shall not be construed to permit or prohibit evidence of feasi-
bility in products liability claims.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.764 (Supp. 1987).
111. Id. The Task Force explained that evidence of feasibility was already recog-
nized as a defense under Missouri law and that this section was not intended to affect
that defense. "This recommendation [regarding admissibility of state of the art evi-
dence as defined in [Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.764 (Supp. 1987)] does not apply to use of
evidence in strict liability cases based on alleged manufacturing or design defects be-
cause the defense of feasibility is available." Final Report supra note 46, at 40.
112. Morris v. Shell Oil Co., 467 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. 1971) (adopting the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) model of negligent failure to warn);
accord Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 383 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another
to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use
the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable
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former, knowledge is a relevant consideration."" Under the latter, liability
may be imposed without regard to the defendant's knowledge of the danger.115
In a failure to warn case brought under strict products liability, a defend-
ant is liable if the product is "unreasonably dangerous [at the time of sale]
when put to a use without knowledge of its characteristics" and "the defend-
ant did not give adequate warning of the danger." Unlike the design defect
case, the issue relating to "unreasonable danger" in the context of the failure
to warn case focuses on the user. If a user with knowledge of the danger can
use the product safely, it is not unreasonably dangerous if an adequate warn-
ing communicating such danger is given.118 Conversely, if a user without
knowledge of the danger cannot use the product safely, the product is unrea-
sonably dangerous if it is not accompanied by warnings that "effectively com-
municate to the consumer or user the dangers that inhere in the product dur-
ing normal use and the dangerous consequences that will result from
foreseeable misuse or abnormal use of the product. 117
Thus, a jury cannot find both that the product was defectively designed
use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is sup-
plied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous con-
dition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
113. Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d at 383; Duke v. Gulf
& Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d at 418; Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632,
638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d at 393-95 (need to
provide warnings for unavoidably unsafe products).
114. Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 383. Accord Hill v. Air Shields, Inc., 721
S.W.2d 112, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(entering directed verdict for manufacturer on failure to warn claim). It must also be
emphasized that the user's knowledge need not be acquired from a warning given by
the manufacturer or seller. If the plaintiff independently knows or should have known
of the dangers associated with use of the product, the defendant does not have a duty
to warn. E.g., Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 418 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (no duty exists to warn of common dangers of which one already knows or may
reasonably be expected to know); Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911,
915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); cf. Shine v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 737 S.W.2d
203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (no duty to warn in negligence action "of the existence
of a condition to one who has actual knowledge thereof as the law will not require the
performance of a useless act. . . .One is not entitled to a warning of that which is
already known to him"). There also is no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.
E.g., Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Haines
v. Powermatic Houdaille, Inc., 661 F.2d 94, 96 n.1 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (con-
struing Missouri law).
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and that the defendant failed to warn. The theory of failure to warn assumes
the product would not have been unreasonably dangerous if an adequate warn-
ing had been given. 18 Failure to provide the warning does not make the prod-
uct defective in design; it only means that the product was unreasonably dan-
gerous when put to a use without knowledge of the characteristics.
Accordingly, parties should be aware that a verdict finding both a defective
design and failure to warn is inconsistent. 1 9 They should seek clarification
from the jury to preserve the issue for appeal.
Even if a warning is given, a product may be unreasonably dangerous if
the given warning was inadequate. A plaintiff may introduce expert testimony
that the warning was inadequate and that the product, therefore, was unrea-
sonably dangerous.1 20 Whether or not a given warning is adequate depends on
its location, its language and how it may or may not impress the average
user.
1 21
In Nesselrode, the supreme court extended the Elmore court's prohibition
on introduction of "state of the art" evidence to the failure to warn case liti-
gated under a theory of strict products liability. 2 2 The court held that the
118. In a case involving an unavoidably unsafe product, the warning must fully
and adequately apprise the user of the dangers. A user may be injured when using the
unavoidably unsafe product, but his knowledge of the dangers precludes recovery. He
in essence voluntarily assumes the dangers of using the product once he has been ap-
prised of the dangers and the manner in which to minimize them.
119. But see Lewis v. Envirotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
In Lewis, the court of appeals stated:
Under MAI 25.04 the jury could have found that the Flex Check Valve was
defectively designed because the outlet gasket was unsufficient to withstand
leakage. Under MAI 25.05, the jury could have found that defendants failed
to give an adequate warning of this condition. Neither of these two theories
requires proof of a state of fact that would necessarily disprove a state of fact
necessary to support the other. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support the giving of both instructions. Nor was there an inconsistency
between the theories presented.
Id. at 112.
The court failed to recognize the basic premise of a failure to warn case: with a warn-
ing the product can be used safely. There is no evidence in this case that the product
would have been used safely with a warning. Rather, the product was still defectively
designed because the outlet gasket was insufficiently designed. Giving a warning about
the "defective design" would not allow the plaintiff to use the product safely: the plain-
tiff could only have one choice-not to use the product at all. Lewis is a good example
of how courts sometimes misapprehend the nature of a failure to warn case when coun-
sel do not identify the inconsistency for the court.
120. In Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981),
the court held that an engineering psychologist's testimony on the efficiency of commu-
nications and the manner in which people perceive and understand certain signs, warn-
ings and similar communications in a failure to warn case was properly the subject of
expert testimony. Id. at 226 (citing Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416,
431-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978)).
121. Id. at 226.
122. 707 S.W.2d at 383.
1988]
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pivotal concerns in a failure to warn case based on strict products liability are:
(1) whether the product is unreasonably dangerous when put to normal use
without proper warnings, and (2) whether adequate warnings or any warnings
at all were given.123 The defendant would be liable even if he could not have
known of the danger at the time the product was manufactured and sold. The
court reaffirmed "the principle that strict tort liability is not predicated on the
presence of fault or the existence of knowledge.' '1 24
The defendant need not accompany the product with the warning at the
time of sale to avoid liability. M.A.I. 25.05 only requires that the defendant
give an adequate warning. It does not state when the adequate warning must
be given. Thus, a defendant may subsequently remedy the unreasonable dan-
ger created by the failure to accompany the product with a warning by provid-
ing a warning to the user or consumer at a later date. If the adequate warning
is subsequently given, the product cannot be unreasonably dangerous.125
The Act fundamentally will change this analysis. Under the Act, a de-
fendant may plead and prove that at the time of sale it did not and could not
have known of the danger causing the plaintiff's injury.' 26 The Task Force
rejected the Elmore and Nesselrode courts' analysis, reasoning that defend-
ants should not be placed in the incredulous position of being liable for failing
to warn of dangers about which they could not have possibly known.127 The
Task Force concluded that strict products liability's function of spreading costs
of injuries associated with defective products should not be pursued where the
danger causing the injury could not have been discovered. 28 When a defend-
ant proves that the danger could not have been known at the time of manufac-
ture and sale, defendant prevails."29
D. Reasonably Anticipated Use
In the formative years of strict products liability, confusion surfaced on
the "use" issue in that some courts formulated the phrase as "intended use"
while others employed "reasonably anticipated use." For example, in Keener,
123. Id. at 389.
124. Id. at 383 (citing Elmore v. Owen-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d at 438).
125. An issue which has not been discussed by a Missouri court is whether a
product which is defectively designed but for which a remedy notice has been sent by
the manufacturer can be considered defectively designed if the plaintiff does not obtain
the remedy offered. In that case, the better analysis would be to consider the product
defectively designed, because as sold it was unreasonably dangerous and could not be
used safely. The failure of the plaintiff to obtain the offered remedy should be consid-
ered as a separate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The jury would then consider whether
the plaintiff's failure to obtain the offered remedy was the cause of the injury or
whether the design defect was the cause of the injury.
126. See supra note 110.
127. Final Report, supra note 46, at 41.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 10.
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the supreme court held that a plaintiff's burden included a showing that the
allegedly defective product was used in a way intended by the manufac-
turer.130 This subjective standard quickly disappeared when courts held that
reasonably foreseeable misuse or abnormal handling would not bar a strict
products liability claim.1"1
There are two facets of the "reasonably anticipated use" requirement.
First, the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement and analysis is based on the
reasonably anticipated use of the product. Plaintiff must prove the product is
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably an-
ticipated use. Second, a plaintiff must prove he was using a product in a rea-
sonably anticipated use at the time of the accident before he can recover.' 32
What constitutes a reasonably anticipated or foreseeable use depends on an
objective standard, not the knowledge of a particular defendant.13  Neverthe-
less, the concept of foreseeability requires proof that the use was objectively
foreseeable at the time the product was manufactured or sold. 3 4 To require a
130. 445 S.W.2d at 365. This subjective measurement is also found in the RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965) which states that an injury
resulting from "abnormal handling" will not make a seller liable.
131. In Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Mo. Ct. App.
1970), the court held that the term "reasonably foreseeable use" included foreseeable
misuse. Since Higgins, courts have consistently found that "misuse" or "abnormal use"
may be reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc. 665 F.2d 188,
195 (8th Cir. 1981) (construing Missouri law); Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485
F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (8th Cir. 1973) (construing Missouri law); Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Jarrell v. Fort Worth
Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Duke v. Gulf & West-
ern Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Baker v. International Har-
vester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Crysts v. Ford Motor Co., 571
S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 638
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975). One must carefully distinguish a situation in which the plaintiff
knows or should have known that he was misusing or abnormally using the product. In
those instances, the plaintiff is barred from recovery by voluntarily and knowingly en-
countering a known danger. See, e.g., Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d
491, 493-94 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920, 927
n.7 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 787 n.6
(Mo. 1977) (en banc); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo.
1969); Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. 1969); Baker v.
International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). This theory is
comparable to assumption of the risk.
The Act eliminates this defense. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
Although eliminating the contributory fault defense, the Act will allow a manufacturer
to argue that the plaintiff was not using the product in a manner "ihtended" by the
manufacturer. This will become an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by the
defendant, although it will not be a complete defense. See infra notes 217-18 and ac-
companying text.
132. See supra note 21.
133. Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 381.
134. See, e.g., id. at 375 n.4. Although the standard is what was objectively fore-
seeable, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of what the individual defendant knew to
meet this burden. In Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Mo. 1977) (en
1988]
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seller to anticipate uses which could not be reasonably anticipated at the time
of the product's manufacture and sale would be to impose absolute liability.'
The Missouri Supreme Court did not impose absolute liability by adopt-
ing strict products liability; it merely excised the concept of foreseeability of
harm (or reasonable care) from the jury's consideration.136 Elmore held that
"state of the art" evidence relating to the ability to know of danger or harm
was not relevant in a strict products liability case.137 It did not hold that evi-
dence of custom and practice or evidence of feasibility at the time of manufac-
ture and sale is irrelevant where such evidence relates to the objective foresee-
ability of use.138
Courts should allow both parties to introduce custom and practice (indus-
try standards) evidence and feasibility evidence on the issue of whether plain-
tiff was injured while using the product in a reasonably anticipated manner.
Evidence of industry standards, government regulations and requirements,
consumer expectations and other design criteria existing at the time of manu-
facture and sale are relevant-although not dispositive-to that inquiry. The
jury should be given this information so it can determine whether the use
could have been objectively foreseeable or anticipated at the time the product
was manufactured and sold.
The Act will not change this analysis. 39 It incorporates the "reasonably
anticipated use" requirement.140 After July 1, 1987, a plaintiff still must prove
the product was unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated
use. That reasonably anticipated use must have been reasonably foreseeable at
the time when the product was manufactured and sold. 141 This requirement
continues to ensure that a transferor of a product is not held absolutely liable
for injuries caused by unforeseeable uses of its products.
E. Causation
1. Identification of the Product Manufacturer
A necessary element of any strict products liability case is that plaintiff
banc), for example, the supreme court held the trial court had properly admitted de-
fendant's advertising as proof that the plaintiff was injured while using the product in a
"reasonably anticipated use."
135. See generally 707 S.W.2d at 375-76, 380-81.
136. Id. at 375 & n.4.
137. See Flmore, 673 S.W.2d at 438; Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 383.
138. See generally Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 379-81 (court discusses this type
of evidence as proof of defect and on the foreseeability of use).
139. Of course, in a failure to warn case after the Act's effective date, a defend-
ant also may plead and prove that he could not have known of the danger or harm at
the time of the product's manufacture or sale. See supra notes 126-29 and accompany-
ing text.
140. See supra note 18.
141. A plaintiff may still be able to proceed on some post-sale negligence theory
if courts were to adopt such a theory.
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prove the defendant's product proximately caused his injury. The Missouri Su-
preme Court in Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 42 recently reaffirmed that the plain-
tiff must establish some causal relationship between the defendant and the
injury producing agent before he may recover under the theory of strict prod-
ucts liability. 43 In Zafft, plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries allegedly
caused by in utero exposure to DES absent proof identifying the particular
manufacturer of the DES taken by their mothers. Plaintiffs argued that the
proof of causation should be relaxed by adoption of one of four theories al-
ready adopted by other courts: alternative liability, concert of action, industry-
wide liability or market-share liability."4
142. 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
143. Id. at 244 passim.
144. Each of these theories shift to the defendant the burden of proving that its
product did not cause the plaintiff's injury. The theory of alternative liability is con-
cisely distilled in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)(1965):
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncer-
tainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to
prove that he has not caused the harm.
In the classic case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (en bane),
each hunter who negligently shot in plaintiff's direction was required to prove that his
bullet did not cause the injury. Failing such proof, defendants were jointly and sever-
ally liable. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. The California Supreme Court reasoned that both
defendants were wrongdoers, both were negligent toward the plaintiff, and that it
would be unfair to require plaintiff to identify the defendant responsible for the injury.
Id. Under those circumstances, the court stated, a defendant is ordinarily in a far bet-
ter position to determine whether he caused the injury.
This theory creates a presumption that each defendant was the legal cause of the
injury and shifts the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.
Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 599,
607 P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Anno-
tation, Injury Caused by One of Several Defendants, 5 A.L.R.2D 98 (1948). The pre-
sumption can be justified on the ground that all possible tortfeasors are joined, thereby
insuring a 100% probability of causation collectively. See Comment, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 986 (1978). Never-
theless, the plaintiff must prove both that each defendant acted tortiously and that the
harm resulted from the conduct of some one of them. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW
OF TORTS § 41, at 263-72 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B
comment g (1965). See, e.g., Shunk v. Bosworth, 334 F.2d 309, 312 (6th Cir. 1964);
Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 30 (D. Minn. 1973); Garcia v. Joseph Vince &
Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 875, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (1978). The doctrine has been
applied only where defendants' tortious conduct was substantially similar. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965); see also Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (O.S.C. 1981). The Zafft court rejected this theory because all
potential tortfeasors were not before the court. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 244.
The concert of action theory holds a defendant liable for a plaintiff's injury where
two elements are established. First, the defendant and the others have an agreement to
perform the act or achieve the particular result. Second, each particular actor charged
with responsibility for the action must have proceeded tortiously. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 323 (5th ed. 1984); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876 (1977). Agreement between defendants can be proven two ways. Plaintiff
19881
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While acknowledging the seemingly compelling reasons for adopting novel
theories of liability which relax the causation requirement, the court rejected
plaintiffs' argument on public policy grounds.
To shift the burden of proof on causation to respondents substantially alters
the existing rights and liabilities of the litigants. There is insufficient justifica-
tion at this time to support abandonment of so fundamental a concept of tort
law as the requirement that a plaintiff prove, at a minimum, some nexus be-
tween wrongdoing and injury.14 5
The court concluded the plaintiff must "establish a causal relationship be-
tween the defendants and the injury-producing agent as a precondition to
maintenance of their causes of action.
1 4 6
can prove the existence of an explicit agreement and joint action among defendants; or
he can submit evidence of defendants' parallel behavior sufficient to support an infer-
ence of tacit agreement or cooperation. See id. Even if defendants have expressly or
tacitly agreed to perform some act, "mere common plan, design, or even express agree-
ment is not enough for liability in itself; there must be acts of a tortious character in
carrying it into execution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 876 comment b
(1977). The case in which a bystander is injured by a car involved in a drag race is the
typical application of this theory. See, e.g., Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or. 354, 397 P.2d 784
(1964); Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963). Plaintiffs attempt to
apply these cases to strict products liability cases by arguing that the defendants either
expressly or tacitly jointly designed, tested, marketed, sold, or obtained government
approval of their products. The Zafft court rejected this theory in the DES case be-
cause the element of agreement or cooperation was lacking. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 245.
The industry-wide liability theory suggested but not adopted in Hall v. E.I. Du-
pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) would hold all defendants
in an industry liable for a plaintiffs injury simply because it had adhered to an indus-
try-wide standard of safety. Adherence to this safety standard would constitute the
tortious conduct. This theory has not been adopted by any court because it would make
manufacturers of a product absolutely liable for injuries produced by their product.
Unlike the concert of action theory, plaintiff is not required to demonstrate an express
or tacit agreement; he is required to prove only an inadequate industry standard. The
supreme court rejected this theory in Zafft because there was no evidence of delegating
authority for safety standards to a trade association. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 245.
The market-share liability theory is a hybrid of the alternative liability theory.
Unlike alternative liability, all possible defendants are not required to be joined in a
market-share liability case, if manufacturers of a "substantial share" of the market are
joined. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Market
share liability also discards joint and several liability and adopts pro rata apportion-
ment based on the respective defendants' share of the market. Id. If a defendant can
prove his product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury, it will not be liable for
any damages regardless of its share of the market. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 145. To utilize this theory, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants
produce fungible goods from identical formula. Id., at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 144. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this theory because of the inherent
risk that the actual wrongdoer is not among the named defendants and that those
joined are exposed to liability greater than their responsibility. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at
246.
145. 676 S.W.2d at 247 (citation omitted).
146. Id. The supreme court explained that Missouri law does not guarantee relief
to every deserving plaintiff.
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The Act does not change this requirement. It states that the plaintiff's
injury must directly result from the foreseeable and reasonably anticipated use
of the defendant's defective unreasonably dangerous product. Thus, in any
strict products liability action, both before and after the Act's effective date, a
plaintiff must prove a nexus between the defendant's product and the injury.
2. Proximate Cause and the Substantial Factor Test
If the plaintiff establishes that nexus, he must prove that the defendant's
product proximately caused his injury. To prove a product proximately caused
his injury, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's defective product (or
failure to warn) was a substantial contributing factor producing the injury. In
Jackson v. Ray Kruse Construction Co., 47 the supreme court explained that
Missouri follows "the substantial factor test of causation.' 48 Under this test,
an alleged tortfeasor's conduct or product must be "a substantial factor" in
contributing to the plaintiff's injury before it is either a "cause in fact" or
"legal cause" of the injury. 49 This test also applies in strict products liability
cases.
1 50
In Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.,151 the supreme court held in
a products liability case that "[p]roving proximate cause. . . is a fundamental
burden that must be met."'' The court explained that the defective product
or failure to warn must be a "substantial factor" contributing to the injury
before it is a cause in fact or legal cause of the plaintiff's injury."'5 Nes-
selrode affirms that the plaintiff must prove that the allegedly defective prod-
uct was a substantial factor, not merely a contributing factor, in causing the
injury before it can be a legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.
This requirement comports with the Zafft court's analysis. The Zafft
court explained that a defendant's conduct or product cannot be a proximate
cause (or substantial factor) of the plaintiff's injury if the plaintiff cannot
prove that the cause for which the defendant would be liable produced the
result:
If the injury may have resulted from one of two causes, for one of which, and
not the other, the defendant is liable, the plaintiff must show with reasonable
certainty that the cause for which the defendant is liable produced the result;
and, if the evidence leaves it to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail in his action.
Id. at 246 (quoting Warner v. St. Louis & M.R.R. Co., 178 Mo. 125, 134, 77 S.W. 67,
70 (1903)).
147. 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
148. Id. at 669 (citing Ricketts v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 484 S.W.2d
216, 221 (Mo. 1972) (en bane) and Todd v. Watson, 501 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. 1973)).
149. Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 669 n.6.
150. "Causation is an element of products liability cases just as it is of negli-
gence cases, and so the cases just cited [involving products liability cases] are perti-
nent." Jackson, 708 S.W.2d at 669.
151. 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
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If the injury may have resulted from one of two causes, for one of which, and
not the other, the defendant is liable, the plaintiff must show with reasonable
certainty that the cause for which the defendant is liable produced the result;
and, if the evidence leaves it to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail in his
action.1 "
Thus, to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant's product
must have been a substantial contributing factor in producing the plaintiff's
injury.
This is an extremely significant requirement in toxic chemical and similar
cases involving allegations that the defendant's product combined with another
cause to produce the plaintiff's injury (i.e., they were concurrent causes). 150
For example, in some cases a doctor will opine that a chemical a defendant
manufactured and sold was a substantial contributing factor causing the plain-
tiff's injury. Upon closer examination, one discovers that the doctor's testi-
mony is based on epidemiological (statistical) studies that exposure to the
chemical and to other potential independent causes of the injury increases the
likelihood that the an individual will contract whatever disease the plaintiff
has. The doctor will admit that each potential cause could independently pro-
duce the plaintiff's disease or injury and that he cannot say that any one of the
causes in this case was the actual injury producing agent. He will admit that
he does not have diagnostic criteria, other than the plaintiff's exposure to the
chemical and the statistical studies, for his conclusion that the defendant's
product was a substantial contributing factor causing the plaintiff's injury. In
those cases, the court must carefully consider excluding the doctor's testimony,
because it is based on likelihood-and would allow the jury to engage in spec-
ulation -and conjecture-that the defendant's product was a substantial factor
contributing to cause the plaintiff's injury.15
154. 676 S.W.2d at 246 (quoting Warner v. St. Louis & M.R.R. Co., 178 Mo.
125, 134, 77 S.W. 67, 70 (1903)); see also Hills v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 710
S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff did not establish submissible case
because plaintiff made no attempt to introduce evidence eliminating other causes which
could have caused the injury).
155. For a complete discussion of concurrent causation see infra notes 163-82
and accompanying text.
156. In an analogous situation, the plaintiffs in Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,
698 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), sought to recover for the enhanced risk of
developing cancer as a result of exposure to toxic chemicals. The court held that dam-
ages for enhanced risk based on mere mathematical probabilities are speculative and
cannot be recovered. In Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), the
plaintiff attempted to recover damages for cancer which might develop in an area
where he had suffered burn scars. The court of appeals held that the experts' testimony
was improper, because the consequence of developing cancer was pure speculation.
"Consequences which are contingent, speculative, or merely possible are not proper to
be considered by the jury in ascertaining the damages, for it would be plainly unjust to
compel one to pay damages for results that may or may not ensue and which are
merely problematical." Id. at 482. The court of appeals explained:
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, testimony of experts as
to the future consequences which are expected to follow . . . must be such as
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In a failure to warn case, a plaintiff need not establish with absolute cer-
tainty that the existence of a warning would have prevented his injury to avoid
a directed verdict. Rather, he may establish a prima facie case by proving that
the defendant failed to warn or that warnings given were inadequate. A rebut-
table presumption arises that an adequate warning would have been heeded.167
In the absence of compelling evidence that the absence of a warning did not
cause the injury, the causation question is left to the jury.168 However, if the
defendant produces evidence that warnings were given, a manufacturer may
reasonably assume that they will be read and heeded. 59 If the plaintiff does
not produce evidence rebutting that presumption, the court should direct a
verdict for the defendant.
in the ordinary course of nature, are reasonably certain to ensue. It is not
enough for the doctor to testify to the possibility of a certain result; his testi-
mony should show that it is reasonably certain to follow the injury.
Id.; cf. Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assoc., Inc., 738 S.W.2d 440, 456 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) ("an inference is a logical a priori conclusion drawn by reason from proven
or admitted facts. It is more than, and cannot be predicated on, mere surmise or con-
jecture. It is not a possibility that a thing could have happened or an idea founded on
the probability that a thing may have occurred."); Howard v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 729
S.W.2d 603, 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of
Torts § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971) in negligence case) (reversing plaintiff's verdict and
entering judgment for defendant because plaintiff failed to introduce evidence which
"affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the
conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result." The
court explained "[a] mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the
matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best
evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the
defendant.").
Testimony by a doctor or other expert based upon statistical studies that exposure
to a defendant's product increases the possibility of contracting the plaintiff's disease
should be excluded for the same reason. The doctor cannot testify that exposure to the
defendant's product produced the injury. All he can say is that there is a likelihood
that it produced the injury. More is required before a doctor can testify about what
caused a plaintiff's disease or injury.
157. Hill v. Air Shields, Inc., 721 S.W.2d 112, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Duke
v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Both Hill
and Duke relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) for this
proposition. Comment j states that where a warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded. Hill and Duke held that the converse is also
true: where no warning is given, one may assume that had an adequate warning been
given it would have been read and heeded. Hill, 721 S.W.2d at 119; Duke, 660 S.W.2d
at 419; see also Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom., Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982) ("In failure-to-
warn cases generally, certainty that the existence of the warning would have prevented
the injury is not required. In the absence of compelling evidence establishing that the
absence of a warning did not cause the injury the causation question becomes one for
the jury."); accord Jackson v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Mo.
1986) (en banc) ("In a 'failure to warn' case, it is not necessary to show with certainty
that the warning would have prevented the casualty.").
158. Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 394.
159. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (1965).
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To determine whether a defendant's allegedly defective product (or the
failure to warn) was a substantial contributing factor in causing a plaintiff's
injury, the jury must be permitted to consider evidence of other causes of the
plaintiff's injury. This evidence would include the plaintiff's conduct and any
other defendant's conduct. The conduct of any nondefendant, including the
employer, causing or contributing to the injury must also be introduced.
Finally, other factors not involving human conduct such as weather conditions
in an automobile accident must be introduced so that the jury can determine
whether the defendant's allegedly defective product (or failure to warn) was a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury.
3. Distinguishing Proximate Causation from Comparative Fault
The supreme court's decision in Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, Inc.60
does not change this analysis. In Lippard, the supreme court held that after
the jury determines a defendant's defective product was a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff's negligence may not be compared
with the defendant's fault to reduce a plaintiff's recovery.161 The court empha-
sized that a plaintiff's carelessness may nevertheless be introduced into evi-
dence to show "that the product is not unreasonably dangerous, or that the
alleged defects in a product did not cause the injury . "... ,,62 The Lippard
court very carefully distinguished between use of evidence to argue that some
other conduct, product or condition caused the plaintiff's injury and use of
160. 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
161. Id. at 493.
162. Id. (emphasis added). Accord Ponte v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 732
S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("A plaintiff's contributory negligence is not
appropriate for instruction. . . . It is also true that a defendant in a strict liability
action may advance a different explanation of the sole cause of an injury, including a
plaintiff's alleged carelessness or negligent conduct, to support its argument that the
product is not defective or that the alleged defect did not cause the injury.") (citations
omitted); Castle v. Modern Farm Equip. Co., 729 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) ("The court in Lippard stated that a plaintiff's contributory negligence is not at
issue in a strict liability case and should neither defeat nor diminish recovery. The
court added however, that such negligence may be used as evidence that the product is
not defective or to show the defects in the product did not cause the injury." (citations
omitted); Love v. Deere & Co., 720 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Earll v.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 714 S.W.2d 932, 935, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Lippard); see also Clark v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 731 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (giving of comparative fault instruction not reversible error in strict liabil-
ity case with verdict for defendant: "The jury never actually addresses apportionment
of fault until it first makes a finding in favor of plaintiff.") (relying on Barnes v. Tools
& Mach. Builders, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)); Lawson v. Schu-
macher & Blum Chevrolet, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 947, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (conduct
of the user may become a superseding cause of damages in a products liability action).
This use of evidence to prove a defect was not the cause of plaintiff's injury must not be
confused with the contributory fault defense, which is eliminated by the Act. See infra
notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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evidence through a comparative fault instruction to diminish the plaintiff's re-
covery after the jury determines the defendant's defective product was a sub-
stantial factor contributing to cause the plaintiff's injury. The former is per-
missible while the latter is not.
This basic distinction underlies all tort law. Before a defendant can be
liable, its product must have been a legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. When
there is more than one potential cause of the plaintiff's injury, Missouri law
states that conduct must have been a "substantial factor" contributing to
cause the plaintiff's injury before it is a "legal cause" of the injury. To deter-
mine whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury, other
causes of the injury must be considered and evaluated by the jury in its delib-
eration. Without this evidence, the jury would receive a skewed view of reality
and would not make an informed decision on whether the defendant's product
was a substantial factor contributing to cause the plaintiff's injury.
This principle is best illustrated by example. Assume that the plaintiff
was in a car wreck in which she had an alcohol level of .23 (more than twice
the legally acceptable level), was driving one-hundred miles per hour in a
twenty mile per hour zone and had fallen asleep at the wheel as the car was
careening down the roadway. Immediately before the plaintiff's car crashed
into a brick wall, a defect in the car's tire caused the tire to explode. At that
same instant, the car smashed into the brick wall at one-hundred miles per
hour and the plaintiff was severely injured. Although one might argue that the
tire in some way contributed to cause the plaintiff's injury, a jury when given
all the evidence surrounding the plaintiff's accident probably would decide
that the defendant's defective product was not a "substantial factor" contrib-
uting to cause the plaintiff's injury and that the defendant was not liable for
the plaintiff's injury. If the defendant were not permitted to introduce evidence
of the plaintiff's conduct-in drinking to excess, in speeding and in falling
asleep at the wheel, the jury would have no basis for concluding that anything
other than the defective tire caused the plaintiff to crash into the wall. This
result would be an obvious injustice.
4. Concurrent Causation and Apportionment of Damages Between Distinct
Causes
Missouri recognizes the theory of concurrent causation. This theory ap-
plies when a plaintiff can prove that more than one defendants' conduct was a
substantial factor contributing to cause his injury.
[W]here the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combina-
tion, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the act of the other tort-feasor, and the injured person may at his option or
election institute suit for the resulting damages against any one or more of
1988]
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such tortfeasors separately, or against any number or all of them jointly. 63
The theory of concurrent causation also applies when two causes (one of which
may be nontortious) inflict an indivisible injury.164
When tortfeasors cause an indivisible injury and there is no reasonable
basis for determining in what proportion each contributed to cause the injury,
they are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from the injury.
The tortfeasors may seek contribution from one another and apportionment of
liability based upon their relative fault.1 65 "The two concurrent tortfeasors
should be treated according to their respective fault or responsibility."' 160 "The
essential thing is the attempt to be fair as between persons subjected to a
common legal liability. 1 67 Allocation is based on the fault conduct of the
tortfeasors.
By contrast, when two causes inflict a single injury but there is a reasona-
ble basis for determining the contribution of each cause to the injury, damages
may be apportioned among the causes.1 68 The rule applies regardless of the
"fault" of any cause in contributing to the single injury. It applies where one
of the causes is plaintiff's or another tortfeasor's conduct, whether it be negli-
gent or innocent.1 69 It applies where one of the causes does not involve tortious
conduct such as the operation of a force of nature, or a pre-existing condition
defendant has not caused.170 The trial court must determine, as a matter of
law, whether the harm is capable of apportionment. 71
163. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Mo. 1965) (quot-
ing Brantley v. Couch, 383 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (quoting 38 Am.
Jur. Negligence § 257 at 946-47 (1941))); see also Koenig v. Babka, 682 S.W.2d 96,
99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (the injured may recover damages from either or both
tortfeasors and neither tortfeasor can interpose the defense that the prior or concurrent
negligence of the other contributed to the injury).
164. E.g., Beineke v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 340 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. 1960).
165. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.
1978) (en banc); see also infra notes 183-206.
166. Id. at 472.
167. Id. at 469 (quoting Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-
feasors, 51 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 137 (1932)).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(l)(b) (1965); see also Glick,
396*S.W.2d at 613 (concurrent or successive tortfeasors are responsible for all damages
sustained as a result of the single injury if "it is impossible to determine in what pro-
portion each contributed to the injury").
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment a (1965).
170. Id. at comment e. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS gives the follow-
ing example:
8. A suffers from arthritis in his arm, as a result of which he has a 50 percent
disability in the use of the arm. He is struck by an automobile negligently
driven by B, and the injury aggravates the arthritis so that he loses the use of
the arm entirely. B may be held liable for 50 percent of the disability.
171. Id. § 434(1)(b). Apportionment will not be possible in two types of cases.
First, there may be no logical way to apportion responsibility, such as when there is an
indivisible injury. Id. § 433A(2). The Restatement examples are a plaintiff's death or a
single wound. Id. at comment i. The principle of apportionment is based upon the abil-
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The burden of proving that apportionment is appropriate rests on the
party seeking it.1' 7 The principle inquiry in cases in which two or more causes
inflict a single injury is whether there is a reasonable basis for determining in
what proportion each contributed to the injury.
Apportionment of damages on this basis is extremely significant, because
each tortfeasor is liable only for the damages it caused.17 3 When there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to the plain-
tiff's injury, the jury finds that a tortfeasor caused only a portion of the injury.
The tortfeasors are not liable for a common legal liability; they are not jointly
and severally liable for all the damages plaintiff sustained. 17
ity to determine the contribution of each cause to the harm, not the relative fault of
different tortfeasors. Thus, apportionment where there is an indivisible harm is not
possible, although damages can be allocated based upon the relative fault of tortfeasors
for the indivisible injury. See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
Second, courts may use tort law policy to make one defendant liable for a portion
of harm that might otherwise be allocated to another cause. This often occurs where an
initial tortfeasor creates a chain of events in which the innocent plaintiff is injured by a
subsequent tortfeasor. For example, in State ex rel. Baldwin v. Gaertner, 613 S.W.2d
638 (Mo. 1981) (en banc), the plaintiff was injured during a fall in a sandwich shop.
The plaintiff suffered additional injury from the subsequent malpractice of the physi-
cian treating the plaintiff for the injury sustained in the fall. The court held that the
physician was responsible only for the distinct harm he caused. As a matter of policy,
the court held the initial tortfeasor, the negligent sandwich shop proprietor, responsible
for the entire injury based upon a foreseeability analysis.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965).
173. Missouri courts have applied this principle of apportionment in a somewhat
analogous situation. If two causes result in distinct harms to the plaintiff, the damages
for those harms are apportioned among the different causes. Id. § 433A(1)(a); State ex
rel. Tarasch v. Crow, 622 S.W.2d 928, 931-35 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (plaintiff caused
injury to plaintiff's eye and doctor's malpractice caused loss of sight in plaintiff's other
eye; the doctor is liable only for the damages caused by the loss of the plaintiff's sight
as a result of the malpractice); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Gaertner, 613 S.W.2d 638,
640-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing distinction between concurrent tortfeasors
apportionment of fault and apportionment of damages between distinct causes). For
example, if a plaintiff develops cancer from radiation exposure and he injures his back
in a fall at work, the harms are distinct: cancer and injured back. Though the plaintiff
may feel overall pain and suffering or have shared medical expenses, it is possible to
roughly allocate damages between the distinct harms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433 (A) (1965) comment b; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 317
(4th ed. 1971). Although analogous, apportionment of damages for distinct harms is
analytically different than apportionment of damages for a single harm where there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to the harm.
174. In Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 528 A.2d 947 (Penn. 1987),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied these principles in reversing the jury's appor-
tionment of damages between two causes of plaintiff's decreased lung function: his cig-
arette smoking and his exposure to asbestos products. The defendants had argued that
there was a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to plain-
tiff's disability. However, the defendant's expert witnesses testified that plaintiff's disa-
bility was solely the result of emphysema caused by cigarette smoking. The plaintiff's
experts testified that plaintiff's disability was caused both by asbestosis, due to asbestos
exposure, and emphysema, caused by plaintiff's cigarette smoking. Plaintiff's experts
41
Dobbels: Dobbels: Missouri Products Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
In Polk v. Ford Motor Co.,17 5 the Eighth Circuit used this type of analy-
sis to apportion damages between causes. In Polk, Thomas Polk was driving a
1970 Ford Maverick at approximately forty-five miles per hour on the inter-
state. His passenger was Demple Martin. Another car driven in the same di-
rection at ninety to one-hundred miles per hour struck the Maverick in the
rear, causing it to jump over a curb and strike a concrete retaining wall divid-
ing the eastbound and westbound lanes. The Maverick rebounded from the
opined that both were significant causes of the plaintiffs injury and that they could not
determine in what proportion each cause contributed to plaintiff's disability. One of
plaintiff's experts testified:
I can't separate these two diseases for you in terms of percentage. My opinion
is that both play a significant role in this man's disability, but I have no way
of equating them or breaking them down. I can't tell you that asbestos con-
tributed 48% and emphysema 52%, I don't know how to do that. There is no
way I know of to separate these two diseases which are so closely intertwined.
I believe that both of them exist to a significant degree and they are both
significant factors in this man's disability. That is the best I can do with that.
Martin, 528 A.2d at 950.
Another testified:
It is not possible for me to separate out the relative contribution of cigarette
smoking and asbestos from the cause of his obstruction pulmonary disease
and the cause of his total and permanent disability. Both factors are impor-
tant in producing the effect and the pulmonary disability that he has. It is not
possible to separate out what fraction of his lung disease is due to cigarette
smoking, what factor, what fraction is due to asbestosis.
Id.
The supreme court reversed on the ground that "there was no evidence presented at
trial upon which the trial court could properly submit the issue of apportionment to the
jury." Id. at 948. The jury "was provided no guidance in determining the relative con-
tributions of asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking to appellant's disability." Id. at
950.
The basis for reversal is significant. The supreme court reversed only because the
jury had not been given any guidance in determining the relative contributions of as-
bestos exposure and cigarette smoking to the plaintiff's disability. If the defendants'
experts had testified that asbestos exposure was not a significant factor contributing to
cause plaintiff's injury; but, in any event, that asbestos exposure did not contribute to
cause more than 10% of his disability, the jury arguably would have had some guid-
ance in apportioning damages. The supreme court based its reversal on this lack of
proof, not the inapplicability of the theory.
Justice McDermott's concurring opinion succinctly makes this point:
The Majority Opinion stands for a single proposition, i.e., under the facts and
circumstances of this case there was not enough evidence to submit the issue
of apportionment to the jury. . . . [I]t should not be interpreted as preclud-
ing the defendants in this case from introducing new evidence of decedent's
negligence, nor precluding a jury from returning a lesser verdict if the evi-
dence would support such.
Id. at 951. (McDermott, J., concurring).
175. 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976) (construing Missouri law); see also Cryts v.
Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Polk and holding a
manufacturer liable for injuries shown to have been enhanced by defective product in
course of accident brought about by independent cause).
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retaining wall, overturned, and slid on its roof approximately 100 feet before
coming to rest. The roof supports collapsed and the car burst into flames.
Martin was pinned in the Maverick and burned to death.
The plaintiff brought suit for Martin's wrongful death. Plaintiff alleged
that the Maverick was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it had a
flange-mounted fuel tank more likely to explode on impact than other feasible
alternatives. Plaintiff claimed that Ford should be liable for the "enhanced
injuries" caused by the defective unreasonably dangerous Maverick. The court
agreed and held:
[U]nder Missouri law a manufacturer may be held liable for those injuries
shown to have been caused or enhanced by a defective condition of a product
which was being used in a manner reasonably anticipated in the course of or
following an initial accident brought about by some independent cause.
176
The court observed that Ford was not a joint tortfeasor with the negligent
driver for all damages occurring before the fire. The court explained that Ford
was liable "only for the enhanced injuries. . . ."I' The court approved the
instruction allowing the jury to determine what injuries were suffered before
the car caught fire and what injuries were sustained after the fire.1"8
Polk involved successive tortfeasors, and the jury was asked to determine
what injuries occurred before the fire and what injuries occurred after the fire
as a result of the independent causes (the driver's negligence and the defective
product). Polk did not involve a single injury for which there was a reasonable
basis for determining in what proportion each of several causes contributed to
the injury. However, Polk supports an argument that a jury should be allowed
to determine in what proportion each cause contributed to the plaintiff's in-
jury. There is no difference between the "enhanced injury" doctrine which
requires the jury to determine how much of the plaintiff's injury was enhanced
by the defective product and apportionment of damages between contributing
causes where there is a reasonable basis for apportionment."7
176. Polk, 529 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 268 (emphasis in original).
178. Id.
179. See also State ex rel. Retherford v. Corcoran, 643 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff involved in multiple accidents; court holds that each defend-
ant "has liability for, and only liability for, the injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result
of that defendant's accident"; the difficulty of proof "does not create joint liability for
these independent and unrelated torts: the defendants are not concurrent tortfeasors).
Other Missouri cases discussing the principle have occurred in factual situations in
which there is no reasonable basis for apportioning damages. For example, in Glick v.
Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965), plaintiff's husband was killed as
a result of the conduct of successive tortfeasors. The first defendant collided with the
deceased's car. As a result of the collision, the deceased was thrown from his car onto
the pavement. Subsequently, the second defendant ran over the deceased while he was
lying on the pavement. The supreme court held that under this set of facts, the defend-
ants were jointly and severally liable for the indivisible injury, the deceased's death.
In Brantley v. Couch, 383 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), the plaintiff stopped
her car at a stoplight when it changed from green to red. The first defendant's car
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One must introduce evidence at trial which will allow the jury to appor-
tion damages. An expert's testimony that a rough percentage can be assigned
to each cause for the part it contributed to the plaintiff's injury would be suffi-
cient. Sufficient evidence must be introduced to give the jury guidance in de-
termining in what proportion each cause contributed to the injury. The judge
should submit a special interrogatory in which the jury allocates a percentage
to each cause to apportion damages. 180
The Act does not address this issue, nor does it change proof of causation
as a prerequisite to recovery." The plaintiff must prove his injury directly
resulted from the defective unreasonably dangerous condition of the product or
because of a failure to warn. As recognized by the Task Force, one purpose of
strict products liability is to spread the risk of injury to the defendant whose
product actually caused the plaintiff's injury. To the extent that one cause of a
plaintiff's injury is not conduct for which the defendant is responsible and
there is a reasonable basis for apportioning damages, those damages for which
the defendant is not responsible should not be allocated to that defendant. 82
struck the plaintiff's car in the rear while the plaintiff was stopped at the red light.
Immediately thereafter, the second defendant ran into the first defendant's car, causing
the first defendant's car to hit the plaintiff's car again. The plaintiff sustained a whip-
lash. The court held that there was no reasonable basis for apportioning damages be-
tween the causes and that each defendant was liable to the plaintiff for her injury.
However, under the theory of comparative indemnity adopted in Whitehead &
Kales, defendants may seek contribution from one another based upon their relative
fault. See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
180. This type of apportionment is theoretically quite different from apportion-
ment based on fault. The egregiousness of conduct is not important to the inquiry. The
effect of the cause in producing the injury becomes the central inquiry. By contrast,
allocation of damages based upon fault does not determine the effect of each cause in
producing the injury. It seeks to allocate damages based upon the degree of fault of
each tortfeasor, or the egregiousness of the tortfeasor's conduct. Defendants therefore
should stress that they do not seek to circumvent the decision in Lippard v. Houdaille
Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), and that they are not asking to
have the jury apportion fault to the plaintiff for his contributory negligence.
For example, a jury may find that a defendant's defective product caused 90% of
the plaintiff's injury and that the plaintiff caused 10% of his injury. However, the same
jury using comparative fault principles may decide that the defendant was only 50% at
fault and that the plaintiff was 50 % at fault for the plaintiff's injury. Cf. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)
(discussing reasons for denial of contribution to intentional wrongdoers). The jury
might reason that a defendant not knowing that its product was defective unreasonably
dangerous at the time of manufacture is not as much at fault as the plaintiff who
continued to use the product without a mask after experiencing respiratory problems.
Because the fault concept incorporates degrees of egregiousness, the jury could find
that the less responsible cause of an injury had the greater fault in producing the in-
jury. Requesting an instruction that percentages be assessed to each cause for its effect
in producing the injury avoids that problem.
181. See supra note 18.
182. The Task Force Report indicates that joint and several liability should be
maintained where the causes are concurrent, i.e., they create an indivisible injury. It
does not address the issue of apportioning damages among independent causes of a
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There is no valid public policy under the theory of strict products liability for
spreading to a defendant the risk of paying damages for injury which it did
not cause.
IV. COMPARATIVE INDEMNITY, COMPARATIVE FAULT AND CONTRIBUTORY
FAULT
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Whitehead & Kales Com-
pany,'s' the supreme court held that concurrent tortfeasors had the substan-
tive right to obtain contribution from one another based upon their relative
fault for the plaintiff's injury.'8 ' The court reasoned that "[a] principled right
to indemnity should rest on relative responsibility and should be determined by
the facts as applied to that issue."'' 15 The right to contribution rectifies the
unjust enrichment that occurs when one tortfeasor discharges the liability of a
joint tortfeasor.' 86 Nevertheless, the defendants are jointly and severally liable
for all plaintiff's damages. If one of the defendants deemed responsible for the
damages is unable to pay its share of contribution, the concurrent tortfeasors
must pay that portion of the damages.
A defendant may obtain allocation of damages by filing a third party
petition or by filing cross-claims. 87 Alternatively, he can file an action after
the initial suit has been adjudicated to obtain contribution from a concurrent
tortfeasor based on that tortfeasor's relative fault. 8 The court explained that
a defendant's right to obtain contribution is not limited to the defendants
named by plaintiff. "To limit any apportionment to those whom the plaintiff
has chosen to sue and against whom judgment is rendered is an unartful and
capricious policy, relying in excess upon the whim and wrath of a plaintiff
before concurrent wrongdoers can share liability." "
single injury for which there is a reasonable basis for apportioning responsibility to
each cause for the damage it produced.
183. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
184. Id. at 472; see also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d
727, 728 n.1 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (substantive right).
185. Id.
186. Rowland v. Skaggs Co., 666 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
187. Id. at 473. Fault is apportioned among those defendants at trial. Missouri
courts have rejected invitations to change total fault apportionment. Jensen v. ARA
Services, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Schiles v. Schaefer, 710
S.W.2d 254, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). If the defendant settles, the effect of the settle-
ment is controlled by Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060, not by the percentage of fault that
would have been assigned to the settling defendant.
188. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d 727, 730-31 (Mo.
1982) (en banc). But see Johnston v. Lerwick, 738 S.W.2d 868, 873-74 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (Satz, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Safeway Stores by noting plaintiff recov-
ered against defendant before Whitehead & Kales was decided; questioning whether
third-party action now appropriate although conceding language of Rule 52.11 is per-
missive and not mandatory).
189. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 473.
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Before a defendant can obtain contribution from a concurrent tortfeasor
based on relative fault, the plaintiff must have a claim against the concurrent
tortfeasor for which he can recover damages. The supreme court has held that
a defendant cannot obtain contribution from the plaintiff's employer, because
the plaintiff cannot bring suit against his employer.190 Similarly, the doctrine
of parental immunity precludes comparison of a parent's relative fault in con-
tributing to cause his or her child's injury.'9' Other than these limitations, the
defendant can obtain contribution based upon the relative fault of the concur-
rent tortfeasor in causing plaintiff's damages.192 The supreme court in Gustaf-
son v. Benda extended the doctrine to include comparison of the plaintiff's
fault.1 93 The court explained that "our five years of experience with a limited
application of comparative fault fully demonstrate that fairness and justice
can best be achieved through a broader application of that doctrine."' 94 The
court noted that "[c]omparative fault affords practicing attorneys a less com-
plex and far more effective method for representing the rights of their clients,
either plaintiff or defendant."' 95 To give the bar and litigants guidance, the
supreme court held that courts in future cases should apply insofar as possible
the doctrine of pure comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act.196
190. See, e.g., State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc., v. Fer-
riss, 588 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); accord Sweet v. Herman Bros., Inc., 688
S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Maryland Heights, the court reasoned that the
worker's compensation act operates to release the employer from all other liability. The
court concluded without analysis-other than reciting the terms of the worker's com-
pensation statute-that this immunity precludes reduction of the plaintiff's award by
the employer's percentage of fault for causing plaintiff's injury.
The court should reconsider its position and limit the plaintiff's right to recover in
accordance with the jury's finding of the respective percentages of fault as between all
tortfeasors, even those immune from suit under common law principles. If the plaintiff
had brought the action against the defendants immune from suit, the plaintiff would be
precluded from recovery. The defendant which is not immune from suit should not be
required to pay for the damages caused by the fault of the immune defendant. The
plaintiff's ability to collect damages from the immune tortfeasor would not be impaired
because plaintiff is not entitled to collect damages from that tortfeasor.
191. See, e.g., Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo.
1982) (en bane); Kohler v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 600 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
accord Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d I1 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). Of course, should
the court overrule its application of the parental immunity doctrine, a defendant could
obtain contribution based upon the relative fault of the parent.
192. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1986) allows contribution between tortfeasors.
193. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). Several years earlier, the court had
refused to extend the doctrine to require a comparison of the plaintiff's fault. Steinem
v. Strobel, 589 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). The lesson to be learned is that
parties should not assume the supreme court will automatically follow an earlier opin-
ion. If conditions have changed, they should seek changes in the law.
194. 661 S.W.2d at 15.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1983) was appended to the Gus-
tafson decision. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 17-27.
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Following Gustafson, courts understandably applied comparative fault
principles to strict products liability cases.1 7 Comparative fault increased the
fairness of the tort system in that a tortfeasor was not held responsible for
damages caused by the plaintiff's fault. Similarly, a plaintiff was not precluded
from recovery for the damages for which a tortfeasor was at fault. Parties
assumed that these principles should be and would be applied to cases based
on strict products liability.
In a sharp retreat from the principles enunciated in Gustafson, the su-
preme court in Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, Inc., 98 held that comparative
fault did not allow a comparison of plaintiff's fault with the defendant's fault
when the plaintiff sues that defendant under the theory of strict products lia-
bility.1 9 The court reasoned that even a negligent plaintiff should be able to
recover if the defective product is a legal cause of injury. 00 What the court
did not explain is why it is fair to allow a negligent plaintiff to recover for the
damages for which he was responsible in a strict products liability case but not
in a case based on negligence."'
The court limited its decision to a case involving only one defendant sued
under the theory of strict products liability. It noted that its holding had
"nothing to do with the sharing of liability by defendants under principles first
enunciated in . ..Whitehead & Kales .... "2o2 Lippard does not affect a
defendant's right to seek contribution from a concurrent tortfeasor based on
the relative fault of the tortfeasor.20 "The principles of fairness imbedded
within [Missouri] law. . .[and which compelled] adoption of a system for the
distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative fault" remain in-
tact.214 The only requirement would be that the concurrent tortfeasor be sub-
197. E.g., Gearhart v. Uniden Corp., 781 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1986) (construing
Missouri law).
198. 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
199. Id. at 493.
200. Id. The court carefully noted that the plaintiff's conduct was still admissible
for purposes of arguing that the defendant's defective product was not the legal cause
of the plaintiff's injury. Id.; see also supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
For whatever reason, the court did not recognize that comparative negligence does
not preclude a plaintiff from recovering damages as does the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence. Contributory negligence allowed a defendant to argue that a
plaintiff should be precluded from any recovery regardless of whether the defendant's
product was found to be defective unreasonably dangerous. Comparative negligence
only reduces the plaintiffs recovery by the percentage of his fault for the damages; it
does not preclude recovery of damages.
201. The court held that the principles of comparative fault enunciated in Gus-
tafson still applied in a case based on negligence principles. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at
492. Accordingly, a plaintiff should carefully weigh whether a case should be brought
based on negligence principles.
202. Id. at 494 (citing Whitehead & Kales).
203. E.g., Welkener v. Kirkwood Drug Store Co., 734 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
204. 566 S.W.2d at 474.
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ject to liability to the plaintiff." 5
In a case based solely on strict products liability, application of the
Whitehead & Kales doctrine of comparative indemnity will not present a
problem: none of the defendants would be permitted to seek a comparison of
the plaintiff's fault. The jury will determine the relative fault of the defend-
ants for the plaintiff's damages. A more difficult problem will arise in cases in
which a defendant being sued under strict products liability seeks contribution
from a concurrent tortfeasor under a negligence theory. In these circum-
stances, the negligent defendant will be permitted under Gustafson and Lip-
pard to have plaintiff's recovery against him reduced by the plaintiff's percent-
age of fault for causing his damages. At the same time, Lippard precludes
reduction of the plaintiff's recovery from the defendant sued under strict prod-
ucts liability.
Accordingly, a court should instruct the jury to determine the percentages
of fault separately. The jury must be instructed first to determine the defend-
ants' fault for the plaintiff's injury as if the plaintiff were not at fault for his
injury. In a separate instruction, the jury will be told to compare the fault of
the plaintiff and the negligent defendant. From these percentages, the court
will determine the proper amount of contribution to which the tortfeasor sued
under strict products liability would be entitled from the negligent tort-
feasor.208 Although this procedure appears disjointed, it alleviates potential
205. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
206. If, for example, the jury determines that the plaintiff's damages are
$100,000 and that each defendant is 50% at fault, each defendant would be required
to pay $50,000 under a true comparative fault approach. After Lippard, however, this
would not be the case. If one of the defendants 50% at fault was sued under negligence
principles and the other under strict products liability, the negligent defendant would
be entitled to seek a comparison of plaintiff's fault in causing the plaintiff's damages.
The defendant sued under strict products liability would not be entitled to this compar-
ison and cannot recover the full amount of contribution from the negligent tortfeasor to
which he would be entitled in a true comparative fault approach.
Accordingly, the jury should be asked to separately compare the fault of the plain-
tiff as against the negligent defendant in causing the plaintiff's injury. In this case, if
the jury found that as between the negligent defendant and the plaintiff, their relative
fault was 60% to the negligent defendant and 40% to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover only $60,000 from the negligent defendant. Under Lippard, how-
ever, the plaintiff is still entitled to recover the entire $100,000 from the defendant
sued under strict products liability. In the action for contribution, therefore, the strict
products liability defendant should not be entitled to recover from the negligent defend-
ant the amounts that should be reduced for the plaintiff's fault. The negligent defend-
ant should contribute only one-half of the $60,000 he would have had to pay as a
concurrent tortfeasor. He would contribute $30,000 to the defendant sued under strict
products liability. The defendant sued under strict products liability would be required
to contribute $70,000.
The following formula makes this principle easy to apply:
A = tortfeasor sued under strict products liability.
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jury confusion and leaves to the judge the determination of the final allocation
of responsibility between the concurrent tortfeasors.
Although Lippard eliminated comparative fault in a strict products liabil-
ity case, it left intact the contributory fault defense. 0 7 The contributory fault
defense bars recovery by a plaintiff where "he voluntarily and unreasonably
exposed himself to a known danger."2 08 This affirmative defense must be plead
by the defendant.2 0 9 To prevail, the defendant must prove (1) the user knew of
and appreciated the danger of using the product, (2) the user voluntarily and
unreasonably exposed himself to the danger, and (3) his conduct directly
caused or contributed to cause any damage he may have sustained.2 10 The
defense must be distinguished from comparative fault because it relieves the
defendant of liability in a strict products liability case.
The Act will greatly affect this analysis. First, it eliminates the contribu-
tory fault defense in strict products liability actions accruing after July 1,
1987.211 Instead, the Act provides that "[tihe doctrine of pure comparative
The jury first determines the relative fault of A and B.
A = 50%
B = 50%
Then, the jury determines the fault as between B and C.
B = 60%
C = 40%
The judge should then reduce the percentage of B's responsibility to A for contribution
by multiplying the percentage of fault for which B is responsible to C.
50% x 60% = 30%
Thus, A must pay 70% of the damages to C and B must pay 30% of the damages.
Another example using different figures of fault will help illustrate the formula.
First, the jury determines the relative fault of A and B for C's damages.
A = 30%
B = 70%
Then, the jury determines the fault as between B and C for C's damages.
B = 70%
C = 30%
Finally, the judge reduces the percentage of B's responsibility to A for contribution by
multiplying the percentage of fault for which B is responsible to C.
70% x 70% = 49%
Thus, A must pay 51 % of C's damages and B must pay only 49%.
207. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 493.
208. Id.; see also M.A.I. 32.23 (1981); McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros. Inc.,
672 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1982) (construing Missouri law); Collins v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1977) (construing Missouri law); Means v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 787 n.6 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg.
Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Lawson v., Schumacher & Blum Chevrolet, Inc.,
687 S.W.2d 947, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
209. See, e.g., Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 833
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
210. M.A.I. 32.23 (1981).
211. Section 36, H.B. 700 (codified as Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.765 (Supp. 1987)).
A defendant was never entitled to a contributory fault instruction in a negligence ac-
tion. See Portman v. Sinclair Oil Co., 518 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1975).
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fault shall apply. .. *"212 Any fault chargeable to plaintiff shall diminish pro-
portionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages but shall not bar
recovery.21 3 The Act defines and limits plaintiff's fault to the following:
(1) the failure to use the product as reasonably anticipated by the
manufacturer;
(2) use of the product for a purpose not intended by the manufacturer;
(3) use of the product with knowledge of a danger involved in such use with
reasonable appreciation of the consequences and the voluntary and unreasona-
ble exposure to said danger;
(4) unreasonable failure to appreciate the danger involved in use of the prod-
uct or the consequences thereof and the unreasonable exposure to said danger;
(5) the failure to undertake the precautions a reasonably careful user of the
product would take to protect himself against dangers which he would reason-
ably appreciate under the same or similar circumstances; or
(6) the failure to mitigate damages.2 "'
By defining "fault" as it has in the Act, the legislature significantly changed
pre-existing law.
Under the Act, plaintiff must prove that he was using the product in a
reasonably anticipated use before he can recover. 15 Failure of proof on this
issue means that defendant prevails. 216 Thus, it is not clear what conduct the
legislature intended for the jury to compare by including plaintiff's failure to
use the product as reasonably anticipated as an element of fault. However, it
must be stressed that the Act does not affect the plaintiff's burden of demon-
strating that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when put to a reasonably anticipated use.211 The Act also requires that plain-
tiff demonstrate that the use to which he was putting the product at the time
he was injured could have been reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer at
the time of sale.
Significantly, the Act will allow the jury to compare the plaintiff's fault
for using "the product for a purpose not intended by the manufacturer."
Before the Act, the plaintiff's use of the product in a manner not intended by
the manufacturer did not preclude recovery. 18 The Act will allow the defend-
ant to argue that an unintended use constitutes fault reducing the plaintiff's
recovery. This will be extremely important because it involves a subjective
standard, not an objective one. The defendant should be entitled to introduce
212. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.765 (Supp. 1987).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. The definition of strict products liability and the elements of the submissible
case require plaintiff to prove that the product was being used in a manner reasonably
anticipated at the time of injury. See supra note 18; see also Final Report, supra note
46, at 31 (one element of a submissible case is that "the product was in fact being used
in a reasonably anticipated manner" at the time of injury).
216. Final Report, supra note 46, at 31.
217. See supra notes 130-31.
218. See supra notes 130-31.
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evidence relating to typical uses at the time of manufacture and sale (because
intended use must be measured at the time the product was put into the
stream of commerce). In addition, product advertising, owner's manuals dis-
cussing the proper use of the product, etc. will be relevant to this issue. This
element of fault should be a powerful tool for defendants to use in establishing
plaintiff's responsibility for his injury.
The third and fourth elements of fault under this section of the Act are
essentially a codification of the contributory fault defense. However, a defend-
ant cannot use the defense to bar recovery. A plaintiff's unreasonable exposure
to the product after he should have known the danger will be compared with
the defendant's fault to reduce plaintiff's recovery. One fault of the "contribu-
tory fault" defense which has been significantly changed is the plaintiff's ap-
preciation of the danger. Under M.A.I. 32.23 and prior case law, the plaintiff
subjectively had to appreciate the danger before the contributory fault defense
was proven. Under the Act, a defendant need only prove that the plaintiff
should reasonably have appreciated the danger. Rather than a subjective stan-
dard, the Act has incorporated an objective reasonable person standard for
appreciation of danger.
The fifth element of the comparative fault defense under the Act is also
significant, because it does not require that the plaintiff be aware of the dan-
ger to obtain comparison of his fault. It states that the plaintiff's "failure to
undertake the precautions a reasonably careful user of the product would take
to protect himself against danger which he would reasonably appreciate under
the same or similar circumstances" constitutes fault. All that a defendant
must prove is that others using the product as intended or reasonably antici-
pated would have used precautions or followed safety practices that would re-
duce the likelihood of injury. With that proof, even if the plaintiff did not
recognize the danger, a defendant may obtain a comparison of fault." 9
The final element, mitigation of damages, includes a broad range of proof.
For example, failure to obtain surgery to reduce damages should be compared.
Plaintiff's reasonableness in not having the surgery arguably would be irrele-
vant. The legislature did not state that it was the "unreasonable" failure to
mitigate damages which can be compared. Thus, if there was any chance that
surgery would have reduced the damages, a defendant can argue that plaintiff
was at fault for not mitigating damages.2 0 If a plaintiff cannot perform his
219. One should recognize that this does not eliminate the causation argument.
If the plaintiff's injury would have been avoided if he had followed safety practices, his
failure to use the practices becomes the cause of his injury. There is no fault to com-
pare, because the defendant's product was not a legal cause of the injury.
220. Although a defendant theoretically can argue that a plaintiff failed to miti-
gate damages no matter how reasonable the plaintiff's conduct, a defendant should use
common sense in making the argument. A jury will not believe that the plaintiff failed
to mitigate damages if the defendant argues that the plaintiff should have undertaken a
course of action to mitigate damages that any reasonable person would consider unrea-
sonable conduct. The defendant should not make absurd arguments or he will lose his
19881
51
Dobbels: Dobbels: Missouri Products Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
previous job because of injury, proof that plaintiff could have performed some
job to reduce his injury also will be admissible under this element of the com-
parative fault defense. Use of this section will only be limited by creative
counsel's imagination.
The procedure for comparison of fault and determination of each defend-
ant's responsibility for contribution will be greatly simplified. Because the Act
allows a defendant sued under strict products liability to compare plaintiff's
fault with his to reduce the amount of damages for which he is responsible,
courts need only instruct the jury to make one comparison of the plaintiff's
and all of the defendant's fault.
The Act also modifies the doctrine of joint and several liability if one
tortfeasor's obligation for contribution is deemed "uncollectable. ' '221 If the
jury finds that the plaintiff is not at fault for his injuries, the defendants re-
main jointly and severally liable regardless of whether one tortfeasor's obliga-
tion is uncollectable. 222 If the jury finds the plaintiff at fault for his injuries,
the remaining defendants are not jointly and severally liable for the uncollect-
able tortfeasor's obligation.223 The Act states that the courts "shall reallocate
credibility with the jury.
221. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.067 (Supp. 1987). Importantly, this section mod-
ifying joint and several liability applies to "all tort actions for damages" and is not
limited to a products liability case. Id.
222. Id.
223. The Act sets out an elaborate procedure by which any moving party (proba-
bly a defendant because this section does not help a plaintiff) may obtain reallocation
of an uncollectible defendant's equitable share or relative fault:
2. In all tort actions for damages in which fault is assessed to plaintiff the
defendants shall be jointly and severally liable for the amount of the judg-
ment rendered against such defendants except as follows:(1) In all such actions in which the trier of fact assesses a percentage of fault
to the plaintiff, any party, including the plaintiff, may within thirty days of
the date the verdict is rendered move for reallocation of any uncollectible
amounts;
(2) If such a motion is filed the court shall determine whether all or part of a
party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and
shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including
the claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault;(3) The party whose uncollectible amount is reallocated is nonetheless subject
to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the
judgment;
(4) No amount shall be reallocated to any party whose assessed percentage of
fault is less than the plaintiff's so as to increase that party's liability by more
than a factor of two;
(5) If such motion is filed, the parties may conduct discovery on the issue of
collectibility prior to a hearing on such motion;
(6) Any order of reallocation pursuant to this section shall be entered within
one hundred twenty days after the date of filing such a motion for realloca-
tion. If no such order is entered within that time, such motion shall be
deemed to be overruled;
(7) Proceedings on a motion for reallocation shall not operate to extend the
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any uncollectable amount among the other parties, including a claimant at
fault, according to their respective percentages of fault." '224 This provision re-
time otherwise provided for post-trial motion or appeal on other issues.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (Supp. 1987).
This provision is essentially an enactment of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
§ 2(d). There is one significant difference, however, in that no tortfeasor's liability may
be increased by more than a factor of two. This means that the solvent tortfeasor can-
not be required under the reallocation formula to pay more than double the amount in
damages he would be required to pay before application of the formula.
A procedural trap of which litigants must be wary is that the section does not
extend the time otherwise provided for post-trial motions or appeal on other issues. Yet,
the Act allows a litigant to wait for 30 days before filing the motion for reallocation
and gives the court an additional 120 days to decide the motion. This will create signifi-
cant problems for the unwary, because the time for filing motions for new trial and the
notice of appeal are much shorter.
Under Mo. R. Civ. P. 78.04, a judgment is entered on the date of the verdict. A
motion for new trial must be filed within 15 days of entry of judgment. Mo. R. Civ. P.
78.04. If the motion for new trial is not decided within 90 days after the motion is
denied, it is deemed denied and the judgment becomes final and appealable. Mo. R.
Civ. P. 78.06, 81.05. The litigant then has 10 days to file the Notice of Appeal. Mo. R.
Civ. P. 81.04. Thus, the Notice of Appeal would have to be filed long before the time
the trial court must dispose of the motion for reallocation under this Act.
If no motion for new trial is filed, the judgment becomes final 30 days after the
entry of judgment. Mo. R. Civ. P. 81.05. The litigant seeking an appeal must file his
Notice of Appeal within 10 days after the judgment becomes final. Mo. R. Civ. P.
81.04. Again, the notice of appeal would have to be filed before the trial court has to
dispose of the motion for reallocation.
These time periods must be followed even though the lower court has not decided
the issue of reallocation. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.067 (Supp. 1987). Under Mo. R. Civ.
P. 81.05, all after-trial motions are deemed decided on the date that the motion for new
trial is disposed of by decision or by application of the rule. Accordingly, litigants
might argue for the sake of judicial efficiency and to ensure that they do not waive any
issue on appeal that any undecided motion for reallocation should be deemed denied on
the same date on which the motion for new trial is disposed. (The cautious appellant
would not be penalized for filing a premature notice of appeal on the issue of realloca-
tion. Mo. R. Civ. P. 81.05(b)). If the appellant does not make this argument, or if he
has appealed from the judgment rather than making a motion for new trial, he should
seek to file an amended notice of appeal once the lower court by ruling or expiration of
the 120 days denies any motion for reallocation. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.067 (Supp.
1987).
224. Mo. REV. STAT. § 637.067 (Supp. 1987). Although the Act does not set out
a formula to determine the amount for which each party would be responsible after
reallocation, this section is quite simple in application. An example will make it easy to
understand. Assume plaintiff's compensatory damages are $100,000 and the jury deter-
mined the parties' fault as follows:
A = plaintiff (50%) at fault.
B = defendant (25%) at fault.
C = defendant (25%) at fault whose obligation is uncollectible.
The court would order that C's equitable share be allocated between A and B by using
the following formula:
Percentage Responsibility of Solvent Party
Sum of all Solvent Parties' Percentage Responsibility
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quires a plaintiff responsible for a part of his damages to bear some of the risk
of a tortfeasor's obligation being "uncollectible."225
The Act does not define the term, "uncollectible." Courts should look to a
defendant's liability insurance to determine whether the defendant's equitable
share is collectible. In cases in which a defendant does not have insurance,
courts should determine whether defendant has assets subject to execution
which, if liquidated, would satisfy defendant's obligation. If the defendant has
sufficient assets, his equitable obligation would be considered collectible. 220
A more difficult problem will occur in cases in which a defendant does not
This results in reallocation as follows:
A's equitable share is increased by $16,666.67
(501(50 + 25) - A of $25,000).
B's equitable share is increased by $8,333.33
(25/(50 + 25) - 1 of $25,000).
In actions accruing after the effective date of the Act, defendant B would be responsi-
ble for paying only $33,333.33. Its share would be increased by $8,333.33.
Another example using this formula will further illustrate its application. Assume
that plaintiff's damages are $100,000 and the percentages of fault are determined as
follows:
A = plaintiff (10%) at fault.
B = defendant (60%) at fault.
C = defendant (20%) at fault.
D = defendant (10%) at fault.
Assume that D is the party whose share is uncollectible. The court reallocates responsi-
bility for D's equitable share as follows:
A's equitable share is increased $1,111
(10/(10 +60 + 20) = 1/9 x D's equitable share).
B's equitable share is increased $6,667
(60/(10 + 60 + 20) = 2/ x D's equitable share).
C's equitable share is increased $2,222
(20/(10 + 60 + 20) = 2/9 x D's equitable share).
B would be required to pay $66,667. C would be required to pay $22,222.
225. See Final Report, supra note 46, at 37. A plaintiff should settle with a
tortfeasor whose obligation the plaintiff believes will be uncollectible to avoid applica-
tion of this section. A plaintiff should argue that the remaining defendants should be
jointly and severally liable for his damages, regardless of the settling tortfeasor's rela-
tive fault in contributing to cause the plaintiff's injuries. Because of the public policy
encouraging settlement of disputes, courts should adopt the plaintiff's argument.
However, courts should apply this section once a judgment has been rendered re-
gardless of whether a plaintiff attempts to settle with a tortfeasor whose obligation is
uncollectible. Application of the section after judgment will encourage the plaintiff to
settle claims before trial and prevent the plaintiff from keeping a party in an action
solely to avoid diversity jurisdiction.
226. The court should look at the defendant's present ability to satisfy his equita-
ble share and not base its decision on contingent liability, e.g., a defendant's potential
liability in lawsuits not yet litigated to judgment or disposed of by settlement. If there
is concern about the defendant's future ability to pay once the right to appeal has been
exhausted, Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 81.09 protects the other litigants by re-
quiring the defendant to post a supersedeas bond "at such sum as will cover the whole
amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and dam-
ages for delay. . . ." Id.
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have sufficient assets and his liability insurance carrier denies coverage. If that
denial is disputed, courts must decide whether to consider the defendant's eq-
uitable share uncollectible. Because the Act intends to spread the risk to both
plaintiff and defendant for a defendant's uncollectible share, the court should
consider the share uncollectible and reallocate responsibility among the re-
maining responsible parties. Each remaining party would be considered subro-
gated to the defendant's claim against the insurance carrier on the coverage
dispute.22 7 To the extent there are any claims for vexatious refusal to pay228 or
a tort claim for bad faith refusal to settle, the parties would also be considered
subrogated to those claims.
Courts should allow any of the parties that became responsible for any
defendant's equitable share to bring an action against the insurance carrier for
the entire amount due. As in a wrongful death action, the claimant would be
bringing the action on behalf of all those entitled to recover.229 This approach
would allow any party paying more than its equitable share an opportunity to
obtain reimbursement. If more than one party files an action, the actions can
be consolidated.2 30 If one party files an action to recover, the other parties
would have a right to intervene to protect their interest.231
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, Inc.,2 32 the Missouri Supreme Court deter-
mined that punitive damages may be awarded in an appropriate strict prod-
ucts liability action. But the test for punitive damages in a strict products
liability case is difficult to meet.233 There must be some element of outrage to
justify punitive damages.2 34 To obtain an award of punitive damages, plaintiff
must demonstrate that defendant put a defective unreasonably dangerous
227. Subrogation is based on principles of justice and equity and is closely akin
to the equitable principle of restitution and unjust enrichment. Cole v. Morris, 409
S.W.2d 668, 670 (Mo. 1966). It is a device to compel ultimate discharge of a debt due
by the one in fairness who ought to pay it. Id. Under this theory, persons jointly and
severally liable have a right to seek contribution. 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 17 (1953).
Courts should use this doctrine to allow parties required to pay more than their equita-
ble share because of an insurance dispute to pursue the insolvent tortfeasor's insurance
carrier.
228. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 375.296 (1968), 375.420 (Supp. 1987).
229. The courts should allow the party bringing the action to set off its attorneys
fees and costs from any recovery before distributing the judgment amount among the
parties.
230. Mo. R. Civ. P. 66.01.
231. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.12.
232. 723 S.W.2d 392, 397-98 (1987) (en banc). The courts of appeal had earlier
held that punitive damages in a strict products liability case could be submitted in an
appropriate case. E.g., Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom., Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); see also M.A.I.
10.04 (Supp. 1987).




Dobbels: Dobbels: Missouri Products Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
product on the market knowing that it would cause the harm suffered by the
plaintiff.2 35 The relevant time frame is the defendant's knowledge at the time
the product was placed on the market.
236
After Bhagvandoss, courts should carefully scrutinize plaintiff's evidence
before allowing a plaintiff to submit a punitive damages claim. Once the claim
is submitted, the trial court must use strict scrutiny to ensure that the evidence
supports the jury's punitive damages award.237 Because Bhagvandoss empha-
235. See, e.g., Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 396-97; see also M.A.I. 10.04 (Supp. 1987)
(punitive damages may be awarded in a products liability action only if the defendant
knew of the defect in the product and of the danger posed thereby at the time it sold
the product; and if the defendant's conduct in nevertheless placing the product in the
stream of commerce shows complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the
safety of others); Lewis v. Envirotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105, 114 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
Plaintiffs often offer evidence of other accidents to prove a defendant's willfulness
and wantonness. Before this evidence is admissible on the issue of punitive damages,
courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances of the other accidents to ensure they
are substantially similar to the facts and circumstances of the pending case. See supra
note 85. Moreover, if evidence is introduced on this issue, the trial court must limit the
evidence to those accident reports received by the company (and received by a person
in authority) before the date the product causing plaintiff's injury was manufactured
and sold. E.g., Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1336 (8th Cir.
1985) (construing Missouri law); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1106-
07 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must know it sold a defectively designed product
before it is liable for punitive damages. M.A.I. 10.04 (1981); Bhagvandoss v. Beler-
sdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (approving M.A.I. 10.04).
236. Bhagvandoss, 723 S.W.2d at 397. The court of appeals in Racer explained:
Strict liability in tort imposes a duty on the manufacturer not to introduce
into commerce an unreasonably dangerous product-whether the danger
arises from defective manufacture, defective design, or failure to warn of dan-
ger. The breach of that duty occurs by the act of introducing such product
into commerce. That is the only conduct which is relevant.
629 S.W.2d at 395; see also Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322,
1336 (8th Cir. 1985) (construing Missouri law) (evidence supporting an award of puni-
tive damages must be based on evidence that defendant knew the product was danger-
ous at the time it was placed in the stream of commerce; "the district court abused its
discretion in permitting appellees to argue [post-sale knowledge] in support of their
claim for punitive damages").
237. The Bhagvandoss court emphasized that punitive damages awards had been
set aside in numerous cases. Bhagvandoss, 723 S.W.2d at 397 & n.5. This statement
obviously supports the proposition that courts should not hesitate to set aside a punitive
damages award. One commentator noted that no award of punitive damages in a strict
products liability case had survived intact through the appellate process. Chapter 47,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLE (1987).
Another tool which the trial and appellate courts will have to ensure that the
award of punitive damages is appropriate is the doctrine of remittitur. The Act pro-
vides that "[tihe doctrines of remittitur and additur, based on the trial judge's assess-
ment of the totality of the surrounding circumstances, shall apply to punitive damages
awards." Section 39.6, H.B. 700; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.068 (Supp. 1987).
Because a movant might seek a reversal of the trial judge's denial of a motion for
remittitur or additur, he should request that the trial court state on the record the
[Vol. 53
56
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/2
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
sized that the award of punitive damages in a strict products liability case is
subject to a high standard, courts should instruct the jury that punitive dam-
ages may be awarded only after proof by "clear and convincing evidence." Use
of this standard would ensure that the jury carefully scrutinizes the evidence
before awarding punitive damages.""
The Act does not modify the basis for submission of punitive damages,
the need to use strict scrutiny to ensure that plaintiff makes a submissible case
for punitive damages, nor the necessity of instructing the jury on the clear and
convincing evidence standard. The Act does change the procedure for determi-
nation of punitive damages. It states that the court shall conduct a bifurcated
trial on the issue of the amount of punitive damages upon the motion of any
party.2"" In the first stage of the bifurcated proceeding, the jury determines
the defendant's liability for compensatory damages, the amount of compensa-
tory damages, and the defendant's liability for punitive damages.240 Only the
amount of punitive damages is determined in the second stage of the bifur-
cated proceeding.24 '
This procedure will not alleviate a defendant's concern that plaintiff will
prejudice the jury's determination of compensatory liability with evidence rele-
vant only as to punitive damages liability. In fact, the procedure may benefit
the plaintiff. A plaintiff will introduce the evidence relating to punitive dam-
ages liability in the first stage. This will allow him to bootstrap his proof of
compensatory liability with the punitive damages evidence. In the second
stage, the plaintiff may introduce the defendant's net worth and tell the jury
that its only duty is to determine an amount of punitive damages which will
punish the defendant and deter others from engaging in similar conduct.
2 42
The Act will allow a defendant to file a post-trial motion requesting that
any award of punitive damages be reduced by the court with amounts previ-
ously paid for punitive damages arising out of the same conduct.2 43 The mo-
circumstances on which it relied for denying the relief sought.
238. One commentator explained:
The [clear and convincing evidence] standard helps to check the risks faced
by manufacturers making daily good faith engineering decisions, and it re-
minds the Court and jury at every step to blow away the smoke and dust of
the litigation battle to see if the stuff of truly flagrant conduct is there.
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products, U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 59 (1982).
239. Section 39, H.B. 700. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.264 (Supp. 1987).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. The court, of course, will continue to scrutinize strictly any award of puni-
tive damages as instructed by Bhagvandoss. It also will have the doctrine of remittitur
available to reduce any improper award.
This Article does not discuss the constitutionality of awarding punitive damages
against a defendant based on the goal of deterring others from engaging in similar
conduct. There are strong arguments that this type of an award is unconstitutional.
243. Section 39.4, H.B. 700.
19881
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tion must be filed within the time allowed for filing a motion for new trial.2 4
This provision was added to further the goals of punishment and deterrence
without inflicting financial ruin on a defendant previously punished for the
same conduct.245 The provision recognizes that multiple punitive damages
awards based on the same conduct will adversely affect the defendant's ability
to pay future claimants and could bankrupt a defendant, thereby jeopardizing
the jobs of thousands of employees and investors' investment in the defendant
corporation.2 48
VI. CHOICE OF LAW
Missouri courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts section 145
(1971) "most significant contacts" test in determining the substantive law to
be applied in strict products liability cases.247 Courts consider all acts of the
parties touching the transaction in relation to the several states involved and
apply the law of the state having the most significant contacts.2 48 The Act will
not change this approach. It does not indicate which state's substantive law
will apply. It modifies Missouri strict products liability law for cases accruing
after July 1, 1987 should a court determine that Missouri substantive law
applies.
244. Id.
245. Final Report, supra note 46, at 39.
246. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir.
1967):
A sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life of a
concern that has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise have
continued to do so in the future, with many innocent stockholders suffering
extinction of their investments for a single management sin.
247. This theory was adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Kennedy v.
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc). Accord Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
673 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). Section 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in Section 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of section 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
248. Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 185 (quoting W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63
N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945)).
[Vol. 53
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VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Under the Missouri statute of limitations, a plaintiff has five years after
his claim for relief accrues to file his action.249 "A cause of action accrues
when and originates where damages are sustained and capable of ascertain-
ment." 210 If a plaintiff does not have damages capable of ascertainment, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run on his claim for relief.
In Elmore, the court ostensibly held that a plaintiff must know the cause
of his injury before he has suffered damages capable of ascertainment. 251 In
that case, the plaintiff had been exposed to asbestos-containing products from
1943 through 1976. As early as 1973 the plaintiff had shortness of breath and
knew from reading union publications that long-term breathing of asbestos
dust caused asbestosis. 252 The plaintiff, however, did not know until 1976 upon
a physician's diagnosis that his condition was asbestosis. The Elmore court
concluded that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until the date of
the diagnosis in 1976.253 The court explained that "[i]t was not until such
diagnosis was made that the character of the condition (asbestosis) and its
cause (breathing asbestos dust) first "came together" for the plaintiff.25 '
The Elmore court did not consider the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's
failure to determine the cause of his injury. Nonetheless, courts should hold
that a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when a reasonable person should have
determined the injury and cause of the injury. Although plaintiffs who could
not reasonably have discovered their injury and its cause should not be pre-
cluded from pursuing a claim, the statute of limitations should operate to pre-
clude a plaintiff from bringing an action more than five years after his dam-
ages were reasonably capable of ascertainment.
This approach follows earlier decisions by the Missouri Supreme Court
and recognizes the public policy that statutes of limitation are intended to
prevent open-ended liability. In Jepson v. Stubbs25' the supreme court rejected
a "discovery rule":
In so suggesting [a discovery rule], professor Davis seeks to arrive at what he
deems to be a more just result. However, to so construe the language of the
existing (§ 516.100) would be to re-write the statute so as to establish a "dis-
covery" rather than "capable of ascertainment" test in all instances to which
the statutes of limitation are applicable. This is not what the legislature did
and it is not for us to rewrite the statute to so provide.251
249. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1978).
250. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 436.
251. 673 S.W.2d at 436.
252. One symptom of asbestosis is that it can cause shortness of breath.
253. 673 S.W.2d at 436.
254. Id.
255. 555 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
256. Id. at 313 (discussing Davis, "Tort Liability and the Statutes of Limita-
tion," 33 Mo. L. REV. 171, 192 (1968) in which the author suggests that "normal
cannons of construction would not be offended if the phrase 'capable of ascertainment'
1988]
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To read Jepson consistently with Elmore, courts should conclude that the Mis-
souri Supreme Court has not adopted the subjective discovery rule but has
instead adopted an objective reasonably capable of ascertainment standard.25 7
A critical issue in a strict product liability action is which state's statute
of limitation applies. Missouri's "borrowing statute" controls which state's
statute of limitation applies. It provides that "[w]henever a cause of action has
been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it
originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought
in any of the courts in this state. '2 8 The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the term "originated" in the statute should be accorded the meaning "ac-
crued. '259 The court determined in Dorris v. McClanahan that this means the
state where the plaintiff sustained damages capable of ascertainment is the
state whose statute of limitations should apply.280
Before the supreme court's adoption of the most significant contacts test
for determining which state's substantive law to apply, this interpretation of
the borrowing statute was consistent with the legislature's intent. Missouri had
followed the lex loci delicti rule in the choice of law to be applied in tort
actions.28' Under this rule, the law of the state where the tort was committed
governed everything except procedure.282 The action thus originated in the
state whose substantive law would apply.
To prevent a party from forum shopping to find a forum with a favorable
statute of limitation, the legislature passed the borrowing statute. Courts had
previously held to the distinction between procedural issues and substantive
issues: they applied the procedural laws (including the statutes of limitation)
of the forum state and the substantive law of the state where the action
originated (under the lex loci rule). The borrowing statute required the courts
to apply both the substantive law and the statute of limitation of the state
where the action originated.
The court's interpretation of the term "originated" in the borrowing stat-
ute seems to circumvent the intent of the legislature to require that the sub-
stantive law and the statute of limitations of the same state be applied. The
plaintiff in Dorris had argued the court should use the most significant con-
were construed to mean 'capable of ascertainment in the normal course of events by
this particular plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence.' ").
257. But see Renfroe v. Eli Lily & Co., 541 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mo.) affd, 686
F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982) (setting forth a two-pronged approach for determining ac-
crual of causes of action under section 516.100: "[Tlhe present plaintiffs' claim did not
arise or accrue until (1) the plaintiff suffered reasonably discoverable injuries and (2)
the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, which-
ever first occurred, their injuries were caused by DES exposure.").
258. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.190 (1978).
259. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 436; Dorris v. McClanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo.
1987) (en banc).
260. 725 S.W.2d at 871; see also Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 436.
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tacts test to determine whose statute of limitations would apply. The court
rejected that approach, although it would result in applying the substantive
law and statute of limitations of the same state. Instead, the court reasoned
that "the Missouri legislature has enacted the borrowing statute which pre-
cludes a conflict of law question .... "263 What the court failed to recognize is
that a choice of law question was not required. Instead, interpretation of the
term "originated" was what was at issue. The term originated could have been
interpreted to apply the statute of limitations of the state whose substantive
law applied.2 "'
As a result of the court's interpretation of the borrowing statute, there
will be anomalous results. For example, in Elmore, the court concluded that
the cause of action originated in the state where the diagnosis occurred (Mis-
souri). 26 5 Fortunately, the state where the diagnosis occurred was the same
state whose substantive law applied under the most significant contacts test.
However, it would have been just as likely that the plaintiff had flown to Mayo
Institute in Minnesota for diagnosis of his condition. Under the court's inter-
pretation of the borrowing statute, it would have applied Minnesota's statute
of limitations even if that was plaintiff's only contact with the state.
The Act does not change the statute of limitations nor does it address the
borrowing statute. Accordingly, courts will continue to apply prior law. If the
courts do not reconsider the interpretation of the borrowing statute, the legis-
lature should amend it to prevent the anomalous results which may occur as a
result of the Elmore and Dorris decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Act represents a legislative attempt to alter the course of Missouri
products liability law. The electorate and their duly-elected representatives
perceived that products liability law made product manufacturers and sellers
insurers for all injuries caused by use of their products. To refocus Missouri
products liability law, the legislature statutorily mandated that the ability to
know of a product's danger at the time of sale was relevant in a strict products
liability case. The legislature declared that a plaintiff's fault for causing his
injuries must be compared to diminish his recovery: a plaintiff must take some
responsibility for his conduct. Joint and several liability was modified to re-
quire a responsible plaintiff to share some of the uncollectible defendant's eq-
uitable share.
263. 725 S.W.2d at 871.
264. The Florida Supreme Court recently took this approach in Bates v. Cook,
Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112 (1987). The court noted that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS § 142 (1986) supported this position. The court concluded "that the signifi-
cant relationships test should be employed to decide in which state the cause of action
'arose.' The borrowing statute will only come into play if it is determined that the cause
of action arose in another state." Bates, 509 So. 2d at 1115.
265. 673 S.W.2d at 436.
1988]
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Courts should follow the legislature's lead. They should apply the Act and
the common law to ensure that manufacturers and sellers are held accountable
only for a plaintiff's injuries actually caused by a defective unreasonably dan-
gerous product. Products liability law should be developed to compensate a
plaintiff for injuries caused by a defective product, not for injury produced by
another cause or produced by plaintiff's fault. Hopefully the comments and
observations made in this Article will assist the courts in achieving these goals.
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